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Nudging Parents 
Meredith J. Harbach" 
Abstract: Childcare quality matters, and parents intuitively 
understand that it does. Among the features of childcare parents 
most value, quality is regularly at the top of the list. Yet experts 
consistently rate childcare quality in the United States as 
mediocre at best. Why the disconnect? This Article argues that 
behavioral market failure is an important piece of the puzzle. 
Standard economic theory assumes parents are rational market 
actors, and even market failure theory cannot account for their 
imperfect rationality. But the paradox of poor childcare quality 
is not just market failure; it's behavioral market failure. This 
diagnosis not only helps us understand the market's 
dysfunction, but also enables us to think creatively about 
solutions. Armed with insights from behavioral economics, 
policymakers can identify, and in some cases capitalize on, 
parents' behavioral anomalies, "nudging" them toward their 
desired childcare goals. Nudging parents is an important step 
toward building a better network of childcare to care for, 
nurture, and develop America's children. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States the market, rather than family members, provides a 
significant percentage of the care for America's young children, especially from 
birth through age five, before most will begin formal elementary schooling. 1 The 
quality of that care matters, and parents understand that it does. They report 
quality is an important feature in weighing childcare options for their children, 2 
1 In this Article, references to "childcare" mean care provided to children under age six provided by 
someone other than parents or legal guardians. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL 
AGENCIES, CHILD CARE: LIKE THE MILITARY, IS IT TIME FOR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY? 6 (2011), 
http ://naccrra.com/ sites/ default/tiles/pub I ications/naccrra_pub I icati ons/2012/ child_ care _I ike _ the_m i 1 
itary.pdf [hereinafter LIKE THE MILITARY]. The primary categories of non-family care are childcare 
centers, group home childcare, family childcare, and in-home childcare. See Child Care and 
Development Fund, 45 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2014). 
2 See ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & VIRGINIA D. ALLHUSEN, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CHILDCARE 
51-62, 179-87 (2005); ANGELA BROWNE MILLER, THE DAY CARE DILEMMA: CRITICAL CONCERNS 
FOR AMERICAN FAMILIES 198 (1990) (listing staff warmth as the most important feature of a child 
care program, followed by educational program and social activities); NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD CARE 
RES. & REFFERAL AGENCIES, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CHILD CARE IN THE UNITED STATES, 5 
(Nov. 2008), http://usa.childcareaware.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/03/2009 _parents_perception_ 
report-r3.pdf [hereinafter NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS]; Debby Cryer, et al., Parents' 
Perceptions of their Children's Child Care: A Cross-National Comparison, 17 EARLY CHILDHOOD 
RESEARCH Q. 259, 267 (2002) (giving high importance to aspects of childcare reflected in professional 
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and many report quality is the most important feature. 3 Likewise, many parents 
believe their children are in fact receiving high quality childcare. 4 
Yet the average quality of childcare nationwide is mediocre at best. 5 
Childcare experts characterize the market as a "tragedy,"6 a "national scandal," 
definitions of childcare quality); G. Anne Bogat & Leah K. Gensheimer, Discrepancies Between the 
Attitudes and Actions of Parents Choosing Day Care, 15 CHILD CARE Q. 159, 167 (1986); Katherine 
Kensinger Rose & James Elicker, Parental Decision Making About Child Care, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 
1161, 1177 (2008); Anne B. Shlay, African American, White and Hispanic Child Care Preferences: 
A Factorial Survey Analysis of Wei.fare Leavers by Race and Ethnicity, 39 Soc. SCI. RES. 125, 139 
(2010). 
3 See CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at 51; NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, 
supra note 2, at 5 (quality was 40% of parents' biggest concern about child care); Ellen Kisker & 
Rebecca Maynard, Quality. Cost, and Parental Choice of Child Care, in THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD 
CARE 127, 136 (David M. Blau ed., 1991) ("Parents select their child care arrangements on the basis 
of quality, location, and cost considerations, in that order."); MILLER, supra note 2, at 198; Jinseok 
Kim & Maryah Stella Fram, Profiles of Choice: Parents' Patterns of Priority in Child Care Decision-
Making, 24 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 77, 88 (2009) (greatest proportion of parents in the study 
prioritized learning and quality); Vicki Peyton et al., Reasons for Choosing Child Care: Associations 
with Family Factors, Quality, and Satisfaction, 16 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 191, 198 (200 l )(55 .9% 
of mothers rated quality as the most important factor in selecting care); Helen Raikes et al., Parent 
Experiences with State Child Care Subsidy Systems and Their Perceptions of Choice and Quality in 
Care Selected, 23 EARLY EDUC. & DEV. 558, 576 (2012) [hereinafter Parent Experiences]. Of course, 
the preference for quality varies according to a variety of demographic differences, including race, 
education, class, ethnicity, and sex. See Leigh A. Leslie, Richard Ettenson & Patricio Cumsille, 
Selecting a Child Care Center: What Really Matters to Parents?, 29 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 299, 
303-04 (2000); Rose & Elicker, supra note 2, at 1177-80. 
4 See BROWNE MILLER, supra note 2, at 199-201; Debby Cryer & Margaret Burchinal, Parents as 
Child Care Consumers, 12 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 35, 54 (1997) (parents overestimate quality 
and are unaware they are not obtaining high quality); Parent Experiences, supra note 3, at 577 (73.6% 
of parents rated the overall quality of the childcare arraignment as either "excellent" or "perfect"); 
Cryer, et al., supra note 2, at 269, 273 (strong tendency of parents to give high quality scores to 
children's preschool classrooms); LOUIS MANFRA ET AL., PARENT PERCEPTIONS ABOUT CHILDCARE 
QUALITY 15-16, dss.mo.gov/cbec/pdf/parent-perception-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) 
(parents generous with grades and ranking of childcare providers); Helen Raikes et al., Parent 
Perceptions of Child Care Choice and Quality in Four States, PUBLICATIONS CTR. ON CHILD., 
FAMILIES AND L. 4 (Oct, 31, 2005), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ccflpubs/14 (most parents in study 
rated provider quality highly) [hereinafter Parent Perceptions]. 
5 See ELIZABETH PALLEY & COREY S. SHDAIMAH, IN OUR HANDS: THE STRUGGLE FOR U.S. CHILD 
CARE POLICY 131 (2014); The NJCHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development: Findings 
for Children Up to Age 4 0 Years, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
9-11 (2006), http://psycnet.apa.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/joumals/amp/61/2/99.pdf& product Code=pa 
[hereinafter NICHD]; EDWARD ZIGLER ET AL., THE TRAGEDY OF CHILD CARE IN AMERICA 10 (2009). 
See also AJA y CHAUDRY, JULIA HENL y & MARCIA MEYERS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CHILD 
CARE DECISION-MAKING I (20 I 0), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/conceptual_ 
frameworks.pdf. Indeed, a recent study by the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development reports that "most child care settings in the United States provide care that is 'fair' 
(between 'poor' and 'good')." NICHD, supra, at 11. Similarly, Professor Edward F. Zigler, founder 
of the Edward Zigler Center in Child Development and Social Policy at the Yale School of Medicine, 
wrote in 2009: "the quality of child care in America remains woefully inadequate, averaging 
somewhere between poor and mediocre." ZIGLER ET AL., supra, at 10. 
6 ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at ix. 
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and the "most serious problem for children in our society."7 Notwithstanding 
parental preferences for high childcare quality, relatively few children are 
receiving it. 8 
How do we explain the disconnect? Perhaps the most pressing explanation is 
that many parents lack the resources to purchase quality childcare for their 
children.9 And, as I have argued elsewhere, another explanation is classic market 
failure. 10 The childcare market is imperfect. Within this market, parental demand 
for quality is lower than optimal because of positive externalities and information 
problems. 11 But the answer is undoubtedly even more complex. Childcare 
decisions are deeply personal and involve some of our strongest affective ties. 
They often reflect an uneasy combination of emotion, pragmatism, and 
economics. And they are exercised in a market characterized by complexity, 
ambiguity, and diversity of options. These features of childcare decision-making 
create the conditions for error, sometimes based on completely irrelevant factors 
like the timing, framing, or number of options presented. In short, childcare 
decisions may not be perfectly rational-at least not in an economic sense. 
This Article argues that behavioral market failure helps explain the 
dysfunction in our childcare market. Over the last several decades, behavioral 
economists have mined judgment and decision-making literature for insights into 
how people actually form judgments and make decisions, establishing that a broad 
array of mental shortcuts and cognitive biases impact them. 12 Behavioral law and 
economics scholars have translated these lessons into law reform proposals in a 
wide range of settings. 13 But although childcare is one of the United States' most 
complex, important, and opaque markets, to date no one has used the discipline's 
insights to argue in depth for reforms to childcare law and policy. 14 
7 See Meredith Johnson, Childcare Market Failure, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 659, 669-72 [hereinafter 
Harbach, Childcare Market Failure]. 
8 Id. at 670-71. 
9 Id. at 672. 
10 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
11 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 679-8.7. 
12 For some of the more recent explorations of this research, see, e.g., DAN ARlELY, THE UPSIDE OF 
IRRATIONAL!TY (2011); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS (2010); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
13 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013); OREN BAR-GILL, 
SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, & PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); 
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEAL TH, 
WEAL TH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) [hereinafter NUDGE). 
14 See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 10. But see id. at 9-17; Janneke Plantenga, local Providers 
and loyal Parents: Competition and Consumer Choice in the Dutch Childcare, in CHILDCARE 
MARKETS: CAN THEY DELIVER AN EQUITABLE SERVICE? 63, 70-72 (Eva Lloyd & Helen Penn eds., 
2012). 
Nudging Parents 77 
This project fills that gap by arguing that behavioral economics helps to 
explain the discrepancies among what parents want from childcare, what they 
demand, and what their children ultimately receive. This diagnosis not only helps 
to explain the market's dysfunction, but also enables us to think creatively about 
solutions. Law- and policymakers can reform childcare law and policy to account 
for imperfect rationality in childcare decision-making. Borrowing a tag from 
others in behavioral law and economics,15 I call this approach "nudging parents." 
Rather than overriding parental prerogatives, policymakers can identify, and in 
some cases capitalize on, parents' behavioral anomalies to enhance childcare 
judgments and decisions. Thus, just as behavioral market failure is this Article's 
partial diagnosis of our childcare problem, nudging parents is its prescription. 
Part I provides an overview of childcare quality and our childcare market, 
first explaining the features and implications of childcare quality, and then 
exploring the current state of the market and its failings. Part I ends by explaining 
that the standard neoclassic diagnosis of market failure cannot fully account for 
the paradox of childcare preferences versus childcare realities. Part II complicates 
the traditional market failure model by explaining how the childcare market 
manifests aspects of behavioral market failure, and examines how a variety of 
heuristics and biases implicate childcare decision-making. Part III makes the case 
for nudging parents toward more authentic childcare choices, even in the face of 
concerns about state intrusion into such quintessentially private matters as the care 
of children. Carefully designed nudges can help empower parents to make more 
accurate childcare decisions for their children and their families, without 
overriding parental choice. 
The drivers of dysfunction in our childcare market are complex and 
multifaceted. Although no single program or set of policies can alone resolve the 
problems that beset American childcare, 16 behavioral economics offers powerful 
methods to reshape and improve many areas oflaw and regulation. Incorporating 
those lessons in this context offers one promising avenue to enhance childcare 
decision-making and to develop a complementary, integrated approach to 
childcare law and policy. 
I: THE CHILDCARE MARKET: A STUDY IN FAILURE 
In this Part, I set the stage for the contributions of behavioral economics by 
reviewing conventional economic analysis of the childcare market, and the law's 
interaction with it. I begin with a brief description of childcare quality and its 
significance. I then set out the standard microeconomic diagnosis of our childcare 
market's problems: market failure. Finally, I explain why conventional market 
15 See NUDGE, supra note 13. 
16 Cf ROBERTA WEBER, OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, ADM IN. FOR CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES, UNDERSTANDING PARENTS' CHILD CARE DECISION-MAKING: A FOUNDATION FOR POLICY 
MAKING 7 (2011 ), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/parents_childcare.pdf. 
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failure is an incomplete explanation for the problems at work in the childcare 
market. 
A. The Significance of Quality 
Decades of research have established a connection between childcare quality 
and child outcomes. Before proceeding to my analysis of the childcare market, I 
pause briefly to explain what quality childcare is, how it's measured, and what 
difference it makes. 
For experts, the definition of quality is straightforward: Quality childcare 
should, at a minimum, meet children's social, cognitive, physical, and emotional 
needs. 17 "Developmental" childcare is characterized as providing "safe and 
healthful care, developmentally appropriate stimulation, positive interactions with 
adults, encouragement of the child's individual emotional growth, and promotion 
of positive relationships with other children."18 
There are two separate measures of quality in the child development 
literature: process quality and structural quality. 19 Process quality looks to the 
dynamics of children's interactions with their caregivers and with other children 
in their childcare environments.20 Structural quality refers to the specific features 
of a particular childcare environment, child-staff ratio, group size, teacher 
education and training, safety, staffing issues, program administration, and the 
like.21 
Child development research indicates that the dynamic process quality of care 
is most determinative of child outcomes. 22 But process quality is difficult to 
measure. Structural features of care are more accessible barometers. 23 
Accordingly, a standard measure of childcare quality is whether it meets the types 
of structural standards established by accreditation organizations or by state 
licensing authorities.24 
17 ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 67. 
18 Id. Dr. Edward Zigler and his colleagues view developmental care as a "pragmatic compromise" 
between custodial care that does nothing more than keep children safe while parents work, and 
comprehensive care, which works with children and parents to provide for a range of children's needs 
beyond standard care. 
19 DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 126 (2001) [hereinafter 
CHILD CARE PROBLEM]; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at 39-40. 
2° CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 125-26; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, 
at 39-40. 
21 CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 126; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at 
39-40. 
22 See Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 670 n.67. 
23 CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 126-27. 
24 Id. at 126. 
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Beyond expert consensus, "childcare" can mean different things to different 
people, and that figures into notions of quality, too. 25 For some, childcare is little 
more than what child development expert Edward Zigler characterizes as a 
"container"-a place where children go while their parents work. 26 Others 
understand childcare as any group setting 'that provides paid caregiving. 27 Or 
childcare might be understood as care provided by anyone other than a parent. 28 
Childcare also serves a variety of family needs, including parental work support, 
child safety, child development, and school readiness. 29 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
then, parents' definitions of childcare "quality" can vary, as do their childcare 
needs and goals. 30 
Despite this heterogeneity, overall parental 31 preferences and priontles 
regarding childcare are remarkably consistent: They place a high value on quality 
of care.32 In a multitude of studies, parents rank safety, caregiver warmth, and 
educational development as the most important features of childcare. 33 Though 
parents might not be familiar with the child development literature, they care 
about both process quality features like the emotional tone of the setting and the 
25 MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 37. 
26 ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at xi, I. 
27 Id. at I. 
2s Id. 
29 WEBER, supra note 16, at 7. 
JO NICOLE FORRY ET AL., OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN 
& FAMILIES, CHILD CARE DECISION-MAKING LITERATURE REVIEW 5, 15 (2013), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/child_care_decision_makin~_literature_review_pdf_ 
version_v2.pdf; Parent Perceptions, supra note 4, at 3. Parents' preferences for childcare are dynamic, 
and may be affected by the available options. See WEBER, supra note 16, at 5. 
31 Although I characterize these preferences, judgments, and decisions as "parental," l do not intend 
to gloss over the reality that women remain primarily responsible for caring for, and procuring care 
for, children in the United States. Outsourced care generally is assumed to be essential to enable 
mothers, not fathers, to pursue paid employment. Mothers, and women more generally, continue to 
play the dominant role in childcare and childcare decisions. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY SUMMARY (2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nrO.htm (women spent more than twice as much time providing 
physical care to children than men); Brigid Schulte, Mothers More Fatigued than Dads but Still Find 
Jobs and Child Care Meaning/it/, Report Finds, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
nati ona I/mothers-more-fatigued-than-dads-but-find-jobs-and-chi Id-care-meaningful-report-finds/20 I 
3/10/08/37284b2c-2fc4-l I e3-9ccc-2252bdb 14df5_story.html (American Time Use Survey shows that 
mothers spend about twice as much time as fathers on childcare and housework); NAT'L ASS'N OF 
CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, WHAT DO PARENTS THINK ABOUT CHILD CARE?: 
FINDINGS FROM A SERIES OF Focus GROUPS 3 (2008) [hereinafter, NACCRRA, WHAT DO PARENTS 
THINK?]. In an ideal world, of course, childcare decisions, like many other relating to the family, 
would reflect a more gender-equitable distribution of time and effort. 
32 FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 15. 
33 WEBER, supra note 16, at 5; ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 5, 15-16; NACCRRA, PARENTS' 
PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 5. 
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caregiver-child relationship, and as structural features such as provider education, 
training, and adult-child ratios. 34 Overall, parents' preferences for quality care 
largely dovetail with child development priorities. 35 
Childcare quality is tremendously consequential. After family, childcare 
represents the most important developmental context for many American 
children. 36 Burgeoning child development literature confirms that childcare 
quality significantly affects child development, and higher quality care leads to 
improved cognitive and social development for children.37 Children who receive 
high quality childcare fare better than those who don't in a multitude of contexts: 
the need for remedial education, 38 high school graduation, 39 commission of 
34 Forry et al., supra note 30, at 5, 15. See generally NACCRRA, Parents' Perceptions, supra note 2, 
at 6-7; ArthurC. Emlen, et al., A Packet of Scales for Measuring Quality of Child Care From a Parent's 
Point of View With Summary of Method and Findings 22 (2000). 
35 NACCRRA, Parents' Perceptions, supra note 2, at 5; see, e.g., Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 273. 
36 Zigler et al., supra note 5, at 1-2. But as Laura Rosenbury has compellingly demonstrated, home 
and school are far from the only places in which children are socialized. See Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Between Home and School, 155 U Pa. L. Rev. 833, 840-46 (2007). 
37 See Blau, supra note 19, at 129-30; Child Care Aware of Am., Parents and the High Cost of 
Childcare 9-10 (2014), http://cca.worksmartsuite.com/UserContentStart.aspx?category=27 (hereinafter 
Parents]; J. Lee Kreader et al., Nat'! Center for Children in Poverty, Research-to-Policy Connections 
No. 2, Infant and Toddler Child Care Quality 2 (2005); Deborah Lowe Vandell & Barbara Wolfe, Inst. 
for Research on Poverty, Child Care Quality: Does It Matter and Does It Need to be Improved? 99-
100 (2000); NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, Child-Care Effect Sizes for the NICHD 
Study ofEarly Child Care and Youth Development, 61 Am. Psychologist 99, I 13 (2006) [hereinafter 
Child-Care Effect Sizes]. See also Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 680-82. 
38 See generally James J. Heckman, Schools, Skills. and Synapses 90 (Nat' I Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14064, 2008) (15% of participants enrolled in special education, compared to 34% 
of control group). 
39 See generally id. (66% of Perry Preschool (PPS) participants graduated from high school on time, 
versus 45% of control group); Frances A. Campbell et al., Adult Outcomes as a Function of an Early 
Childhood Educational Program: An Abecedarian Project Follow-Up, 48 DEV. PSYCHOL. l 033, I 038 
(2012) (showing 83% of participants graduated as opposed to 72% of nonparticipants, and were also 
more likely to graduate from college). 
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crime, 40 abuse and neglect, 41 unemployment, 42 public assistance, 43 teen 
parenthood,44 and overall health.45 
Given parental preferences for high quality care and the significance of that 
quality for child development, we might expect a high level of quality care in the 
childcare market. Yet the childcare crisis persists. 46 The question becomes why, 
and what to do about it. 
B. (Neo)Classic Childcare Market Failure 
Because childcare is a market service for many families, it makes sense to 
begin an analysis of its performance with microeconomics. Although childcare 
has been infrequently discussed as a market phenomenon in the legal literature, 
economists and social scientists have recognized and examined childcare as a 
market service. 47 These scholars have determined that America's childcare 
market manifests multiple aspects of classic market failure. 48 
40 See generally Heckman, supra note 38, at 90 (PPS participants had significantly fewer arrests and 
fewer months incarceration); David R. Katner, Delinquency and Daycare, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 
49, 57-58 (2010). Further, an intensive program directed at low-income, primarily African-American 
families at Syracuse University decreased the overall incidence, severity, and recurrence of later 
involvement with the juvenile justice system. Katner, supra, at 58. 
41 See generally Katner, supra note 40, at 56--57 (discussing how neglect and abuse can adversely 
affect development); COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF INVESTING IN HIGH-
QUALITY PRESCHOOL: USING EARLY EDUCATION TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FISCAL 
SUSTAINABILITY OF STATES AND THE NATION 22 (2006), https://www.ced.org/pdf/Economic-
Promise-of-Investing-in-High-Quality-Preschool.pdf [hereinafter CED] (explaining PPS participants 
were less likely to be unemployed). 
42 See generally CED, supra note 41, at 22 (explaining PPS participants were more likely to be 
employed at 40 and had higher incomes); LAWRENCE J. SCHWEINHART ET AL., THE HIGH/SCOPE 
PERRY PRESCHOOL STUDY THROUGH AGE 40: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 2 (2005). The PPS students also performed better on other indicators of economic stability 
like home ownership, savings, and financial independence. See CED, supra note 41, at 22; see 
generally Heckman, supra note 38, at 90 (showing economic effects, including monthly income); 
SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra, at 2. 
43 Heckman, supra note 38, at 90. 
44 See generally CED, supra note 41, at 22 (explaining that CAP participants are less likely to become 
teenage parents). 
45 See generally CED, supra note 41, at 22 (explaining that PPS participants at 40 are less likely to use 
prescription and illegal drugs and less likely to have stopped work because of health issues). These 
"health gains are associated with improved access to screening, immunization, and nutrition through 
preschool." THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE 
EDUCATION 212 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007). 
46 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7; see also Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, 
at 669-72. 
47 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 678-85. 
48 Id. at 678-85. 
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Neoclassical economics deems markets inefficient (and therefore exhibiting 
market failure) when they produce less of a good or service than would be socially 
optimal.49 The standard microeconomic diagnosis of problems in our childcare 
market is market failure in the form of suboptimal demand for quality. so 
Economists and social scientists have determined that two phenomena are causing 
low demand: externalities and information problems. 51 
First, quality childcare generates positive externalities. 52 Externalities occur 
when some costs or benefits of market transactions are not fully reflected in the 
transactions themselves, and are instead externalized to others.53 As I explained 
above, children and their families certainly reap the rewards of high quality 
childcare. But they aren't the only ones. The benefits of high quality care spill 
over to society more broadly-to classmates, neighbors, partners, future children, 
colleagues, employers, and the taxpaying public. 54 Human capital research 
demonstrates the economic spillovers of childcare are abundant. 55 In the short 
term, society enjoys increased economic productivity from parental employment, 
a more profitable workforce, and increased economic activity in the childcare 
market.56 In the longer term, we enjoy a more sophisticated future workforce and 
an augmented tax base. 57 We also save money on interventions in education, 
crime prevention, and public support services."58 Because individual families 
don't themselves enjoy all of these broader benefits, they may be unwilling to pay 
a price commensurate with the overall value of childcare, and won't demand as 
much quality as would be socially optimal. 59 Market failure occurs because the 
individual transactions of families purchasing childcare don't reflect these broader 
social spillovers. 
49 ld. at 677-78. 
50 ld. at 678. 
51 ld. 
52 ld. at 679-84. 
53 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 679-80. 
54 ld. at 682-84. 
55 ld. at 679-84. 
56 ld. at 683. 
57 ld. 
58 ld. at 683-84. 
59 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE ECONOMICS 
OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INVESTMENTS 9-10 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/early_childhood_reportl.pdf; LOWE VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 37, at 81; DIANE 
PAULSELL, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR INVESTING IN 
CHILDREN: A Focus ON CHILD CARE 6, 89-90 (2001), http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/-/media/publications/PDFs/econrationale.pdf. For a more extensive discussion of the 
spillover problem in the childcare market, see Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 
678-84. 
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Second, information imperfections also contribute to childcare market 
failure. Multiple studies confirm that childcare consumers lack important 
information about childcare. 60 Parents may have a fair conception of what 
childcare quality is in the abstract, but know little about what is actually required 
for high quality childcare. 61 They may assume that childcare providers are 
monitored for basic health, safety, and training, though in reality many are not. 62 
They may also have little information about the actual quality of providers in their 
communities. 63 They lack information about the location and availability of 
childcare, its relative costs, the features and characteristics of particular providers, 
and the range of childcare alternatives. 64 And because outsourced childcare is not 
readily observed, parents also lack information as to whether the care they select 
in fact provides quality care to their children.65 These information gaps frustrate 
families' attempts to secure the childcare they prefer. 66 When parents lack 
important information about quality, they may be unwilling to pay a premium for 
it.67 Thus, information problems also drive down demand for high quality care. 
If classic market failure is the problem, state intervention is part of the 
remedy. In fact, much contemporary regulation of economic activity is geared 
toward mitigating market failure. 68 Although the law interacts with the childcare 
market via subsidies, regulation, and the provision of information, existing law 
and policy have been poorly calibrated to correct for market failure. 69 The federal 
government and the states both provide subsidies for the purchase of childcare, 
primarily through the Child Care and Development Fund (a supplement to the 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program), tax benefits, and some direct 
provision of services. 70 Except for direct provision, however, these subsidies have 
been aimed primarily at facilitating parental employment and do not condition 
60 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 685. 
61 See Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 275. 
62 NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 6. 
63 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at I. 
64 See Naci Mocan, Can Consumers Detect Lemons? An Empirical Analysis of Information Asymmetry 
in the Market for Child Care, 201. POPULATION ECON. 743, 743--46 (2007); CHAUDRY ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 8. 
65 See CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 9; Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 274. 
66 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 684-85. 
67 Id. That's not to say, however, that information doesn't vary across the economic spectrum. 
68 DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-28 (2d ed. 
2011); ROBERT F. FRANK & BENS. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF MICRO ECONOMICS 428 (4th ed. 
2009). One basic microeconomic text asserts, for example, "the need to deal with externalities is one 
of the most important rationales for the existence of government." Id. at 298; see also id. at 305, 408. 
69 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 697-705. 
70 Id. at 697-700. 
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receipt on any particular level of quality. 71 The existing licensing and oversight 
framework in the United States is limited and uneven, with low standards, narrow 
applicability, and infrequent monitoring. 72 Finally, the information states provide 
on childcare quality and location is fractured and incomplete. 73 
A more robust state response to the externalities and information problems in 
the childcare market would represent a significant step toward enhancing the 
market's functioning. Elsewhere I have argued for enhanced subsidies, regulation, 
and information to counteract the failures in our childcare market. 74 Subsidy 
funding should be increased and tied to quality. 75 Regulation should be more 
expansive, apply to more providers, and be more vigorously enforced. 76 And 
states should provide more comprehensive information about the indicia and 
availability of childcare quality, through direct provision of information, 
screening of providers, and supporting private accreditation efforts that signal 
childcare quality. 77 These steps would not only lead to a healthier childcare 
market in practical terms, but would also prompt us to revisit and reinterpret the 
state's normative role vis-a-vis American childcare. 78 
By focusing our attention on spillovers and information problems, 
conventional market failure theory has much to offer in the way of shoring up our 
childcare market. The market failure lens brings the potential for new perspectives 
and innovative legal solutions to the childcare market. As it turns out, however, 
there is more to the childcare quality paradox than externalities and information 
deficits. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 700-703. 
73 Id. at 703-705. In late 2014, however, Congress took important steps to enhance the quality of 
childcare for families participating in the Child Care Development Fund program (CCDF) by passing 
the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of2014. Child Care and Development Block Grant 
Act of2014, Pub. L. No. 113-186, 128 Stat. 1971. Among the 2014 Act's purposes is to assist states 
in "improving the overall quality of child care services" and improving "child care and development 
of participating children." 42 U.S.C. § 9857 (2014). This law sets forth a number of quality-based 
reforms to subsidies, regulations, and information provision for CCDF providers. For a more in-depth 
exploration of these reforms, see Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 712-18. 




78 Id. at 691. 
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C. Beyond Classic Market Failure 
Despite its insights and contributions, conventional economic analysis alone 
cannot solve our childcare market problems altogether. Here, [consider the limits 
of classic market failure theory. 
In this context, the model has at least two limitations. The first is the model's 
inattention to distributional issues and resource constraints: Many parents and 
families simply don't have the means to purchase the quality of care they desire. 79 
High quality childcare is expensive and for some families, prohibitively so. It 
tends to be one of the highest budgeting items for working families, and is largely 
beyond the reach of low-income families. 80 Thus, although standard economic 
theory tends to be agnostic as to baseline distributions of resources, 81 
distributional inequality in our childcare market is a central concern. But the 
resource question requires additional analysis and prescriptions. 82 And while 
resource constraints certainly interact with the market failures I discuss above and 
below, they are not my primary focus of inquiry here. 83 
79 PARENTS, supra note 37, at 20-25; NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 5 (staying 
at home to care for children not an option because of financial concerns); NACCRRA, WHAT DO 
PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 14, 18-19 (parents had difficulty finding level of quality desired 
that they could afford and was available during needed hours) (high price is main driver of parental 
compromise on childcare choices). 
80 NAT'L ASS'N OF CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF 
CHILDCARE: 2015 REPORT 22-36 (2015), http://www.usa.childcareaware.org/advocacy-public-
policy/resources/reports-and-research/costofcare/. 
81 See Harbach, Chi/dare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 676-77, fu.108. 
82 Indeed, our failure as a society to adequately invest in and ensure quality care for all of America's 
children is both a moral failing and its own type of behavioral failure, writ large. As a country, we are 
shortsighted, far too focused on initial outlays and costs for childcare, and thus make decisions that 
don't reflect our longer-term goals for children, families, and society. By investing too little in the 
short term, we collectively fall prey to present bias in ways that have significant consequences for our 
future. See infra text accompanying notes 215-225 (discussing present bias in more depth). 
83 I bracket the distribution question here, not because it is unworthy of sustained consideration, but 
because a more in depth discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. Resource inequality is an 
important component of my broader childcare market project. Although parents' chief concerns 
regarding childcare are safety and child development, too many of them struggle to afford it. 
NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at I; CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 5, 30; 
MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 26, 31 (noting low-income parents may choose lower quality because 
it is affordable and geographically accessible). Most feel that both parents must work in today's 
economy and that childcare is therefore a necessity. Id. In a recent survey, three-quarters of parents 
agreed that making affordable childcare available is the most important way to help working families. 
NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at I. In addition, data on childcare availability 
indicates that pockets of"childcare deserts" exist throughout the country, especially for infants, special 
needs children, and nontraditional hours. See MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 7. More broadly, many 
contemporary American families are in transition or crisis in ways that make it more difficult for 
families to, in the words of Clare Huntington, flourish. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO 
FLOURISH: How LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 27-54 (2014). Many of these changes 
are associated with resources and family income. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE 
MARKETS: How INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 83 (2014). 
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Instead, my focus in this project is on a second limitation: the ways in which 
rational choice theory oversimplifies market judgments and decision-making. 
Neoclassical economic theory uses economic modeling to predict and explain 
market behavior, and provides models for enhancing efficiency. 84 The starting 
point for neoclassical theory is the rational preference-maximizer (homo 
economicus) who exercises rational judgment and decision-making to maximize 
benefits. 85 But this prototype is necessarily abstract - less complex and varied 
than the realities of market (or other) behavior in the real world. 86 
Thus, in the context of childcare, standard economic modeling would assume 
that parents armed with sufficient means, information, and proper incentives 
would act with perfect rationality and self-control to pursue their preferences for 
higher-quality childcare. 87 And in the absence of market failure, the childcare 
market should operate efficiently and reflect parents' demand for high-quality 
care. But as I explore below, data on childcare judgment and decision-making 
demonstrates that while this may be consistent with market theory, it emphatically 
does not represent reality. 
The childcare decision-making process is complex rather than linear-
dynamic and multidimensional. 88 Childcare decisions are multi-party decisions, 
reflecting attempts to optimize outcomes for parents, children, and families as a 
whole. 89 Most parents "choose" 90 childcare, in part, to facilitate their own 
employment.91 Many also elect to use childcare for child development purposes. 92 
More broadly, parents outsource childcare as part of larger family management 
84 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 1; Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 677-
78. 
85 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 72; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: 
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1218 
(2003). 
86 KLAUS MATHIS & DEBORAH SHANNON, EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE?: SEARCHING FOR THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7, 14 (2009). 
87 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 6--9. 
88 Id. at 1-2; WEBER, supra note 16, at 3. 
89 See WEBER, supra note 16, at 3. See generally CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 n.3, 21-22. 
90 I place choose in quotations because for many parents, using childcare is much more an imperative 
than choice. For many, working outside the home isn't optional, and childcare is, thus, essential. See 
Meredith Johnson Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 254, 263-68 (2012) 
[hereinafter Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare]. Reflecting the complexity and constraints of childcare 
decision-making, Marcia Meyers and Lucy Jordan argue that these decisions are better understood as 
"accommodations-to family and employment demands, social and cultural expectations, available 
infonnation, and financial, social and other resources-that often reproduce other forms of economic 
and social stratification." Marcia K. Meyers & Lucy P. Jordan, Choice Accommodation in Parental 
Child Care Decisions, 37 J. of the Comm. Dev. Soc'y 53, 63-67 (Summer 2006). 
91 WEBER, supra note 16, at 3. 
92 Id. 
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decisions, benefitting all family members and enhancing overall family 
functioning. 93 Parents may be imperfect agents for their children because the 
needs of these three "decision targets,"94 (parent, child, and family) may vary and 
sometimes even conflict. These decisions are also constrained by time, work 
schedules, availability, accessibility, and-significantly-financial resources and 
cost. 95 In the end, the childcare selected may not be ideal for the child(ren), 
parent(s), or the larger family, but may nevertheless be selected because it was 
perceived to be the best of available options, given the opportunities, constraints, 
and barriers.96 
In the face of this complexity, parents' childcare decisions often are 
paradoxical. 97 Studies document discrepancies between parental preferences 
concerning childcare quality on the one hand, and their process for choosing 
childcare and ultimate choices on the other. 98 One recent survey on parental 
perceptions of childcare characterizes these decisions as a "gut check" for many 
parents.99 Despite their stated preferences, the childcare search for most parents 
"tends to be limited, informal, and unlikely to involve systematic data-gathering 
and assessment of pertinent information." 100 In another recent focus group, few 
parents checked to determine whether their childcare was licensed, had 
infractions, or had been recently inspected. 101 
Yet there is a strong tendency by parents to rate their children's care 
highly 102-significantly higher than trained, external observers rate the same 
93 See Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, supra note 90, at 263-68; WEBER, supra note 16, at 3-5. 
94 In the psychology literature, a "decision target" is the person for whom a decision is made. Jingyi 
Lu et al., Desirability or Feasibility: Se/f-Other Decision-Making Differences, 39 PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 144, 145 (2012). 
95 CHAUDRY, ET AL., supra note 5, at 9; FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 22; WEBER, supra note 16, at 
6. 
96 WEBER, supra note 16, at 6. 
97 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 25-26. 
98 Bogat & Gensheimer, supra note 2, at 167. In this study, the parents surveyed placed importance on 
"vague, yet positive, qualities of the caregiver[,]" but during the actual childcare search "called only 
three providers, over one-fourth did not visit any facilities, and of those who did visit, most only visited 
one facility." Id. Further, while all the parents in the study specifically received a childcare checklist 
to help their selection of a quality childcare arrangement, few actually completed it. Id. 
99 NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 8. 
100 CLARKE-STEW ART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at 52. One study documented that some parents 
spend more time shopping for a car than for childcare. ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 79 ("Sharon 
Lynn Kagan, one of the lead authors of the Cost, Quality and Outcomes study, notes that parents spend 
more time shopping for cars than for child care and are 'more likely to look under the hood' of a car 
than to examine a child care setting."). 
IOI NACCRRA, WHAT Do PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 23. 
102 Cryer, et al., supra note 2, at 269, 273; Cryer & Burchinal, supra note 4, at 54. 
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care. 103 Some individuals rate childcare quality as high even in the face of 
indications to the contrary. 104 In the same focus group study, for example, parents 
rated the quality of their own childcare almost twice as highly as experts had 
determined was in fact available within their communities. 105 
What's more, despite perceptions and preferences for high quality care, 
relatively few report they would be willing to pay more for the care their children 
are receiving. 106 Some families appear to respond to price effects and the 
availability of financial resources by increasing their demand for the quantity of 
childcare, but not increased quality. IO? In other words, families who might have 
the means to purchase higher quality care or pay more aren't always doing so. Ios 
How do we make sense of these anomalies? By challenging standard 
economic assumptions about rationality and willpower, behavioral economics 
suggests the realities of childcare judgment and decision-making are more 
complex than conventional economics might assume, and that behavioral market 
failure is also at work. My discussion turns to these insights next. 
II. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS & THE CHILDCARE MARKET 
Behavioral economics supplements traditional economic theory with more 
accurate models of socioeconomic behavior. I09 Behavioral law and economics is 
credited with bringing a more realistic assessment of human decision-making to 
neoclassical law and economics analysis, and more practical prescriptions for law 
and policy initiatives. 110 In this Part, I survey the literature, explaining how 
behavioral economics has refined certain aspects of neoclassical economics. I then 
use a behaviorally-informed lens to examine how parents make childcare 
'°3 Cryer, et al., supra note 2, at 271. 
104 BROWNE MILLER, supra note 2, at 199-20 I. 
ios NACCRRA, WHAT DO PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 20. 
106 Raikes et al., Parent Perceptions, supra note 4, at 24. 
101 David Blau observes: 
[A] decrease in the price of child care increases the quantity of child care 
demanded and the employment rate of mothers, but does not increase the quality 
of care demanded; an increase in the mother's wage rate increases the mother's 
employment and the demand for center care and paid care, but does not increase 
the quality of care demanded; and an increase in family income other than the 
mother's earnings increases the quality of care demanded, but by a very small 
amount. 
CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 83. 
108 CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 7-8; see Mocan, supra note 64, at 744-45. 
109 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 81. 
110 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998). 
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decisions, theorizing that behavioral market failure is at work. I conclude by 
suggesting that given this behavioral market failure, parents would benefit from 
"nudges" in the direction of their true preferences and priorities. 
A. From Homo Economicus to Behavioral Economics 
The most basic economic models for predicting market behavior rely on a 
number of simplifying assumptions: perfect competition, perfect information, and 
perfectly efficient markets that maximize social benefit and generate zero 
waste. 111 Market failure results when market conditions and transactions diverge 
from these idealized background assumptions. But the "invisible hand" of 
perfectly functioning markets depends on more than perfect market conditions. It 
also depends on perfect market actors. 
Neoclassical economic theory models market behavior on homo economicus, 
or "economic man,"112 who is assumed to be fully, perfectly rational. 113 Rational 
choice theory relies on multiple assumptions about the psychology and decision-
making capacity of homo economicus: 114 Homo economicus has well-formed 
preferences that accurately reflect the costs and benefits of available options. 115 
Homo economicus responds to incentives by accurately conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis of competing options, and then selecting the option that maximizes 
expected benefits and minimizes expected costs. 116 Homo economicus processes 
information optimally, 117 and in cases of uncertainty has well-formed views on 
how such uncertainty will resolve, accurately updating these views based on 
probabilistic assessments. 118 
But while standard neoclassical models of rationality may work as predictive 
and explanatory tools in a number of contexts, 119 it's clear that these assumptions 
aren't as a rule realistic descriptions of how economic actors make decisions in 
the real world. As Professors Cole and Grossman put it: "People are not human 
111 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1218; Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 677. 
112 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics 2 
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w7948.pdf. 
113 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1214-15; Russell 8. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. I 051, 1053 (2000); Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 2. 
114 Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 4 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004). 
115 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1215; Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1476. 
116 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1476; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1055, 1063. 
117 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1476. 
118 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1215. 
119 See COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 81; KLAUS & SHANNON, supra note 85, at 25-26. 
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calculators, constantly processing every single bit of information they receive and 
estimating the costs and benefits of the several thousand discrete decisions they 
make every day."120 Instead, homo economicus is a "heuristic fiction: ... a mere 
assumption made for the purpose of analyzing economic problems." 121 
In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, behavioral economics takes the 
reality of human imperfection as the new background assumption. 122 Behavioral 
economists have mined the judgment and decision-making literature from 
cognitive psychology, uncovering data that complicates neoclassical assumptions 
about rationality in market behavior. 123 The literature makes clear we are 
imperfectly-rather than perfectly-rational. 124 Real people display bounded-
rather than perfect-rationality. 125 They also have bounded self-control. 126 
Frequently, our preferences are ill-defined, and are constructed rather than simply 
elicited by social situations. 127 We often fail to maximize our expected utility, 
neglecting to make choices that are most consistent with our preferences and 
goals. 128 Real people make systematic mispredictions about the costs and benefits 
of particular choices. 129 Cognitive limitations constrain our ability to process 
information optimally. 130 We fail to update information rationally in uncertain 
12° COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 81. 
121 KLAUS & SHANNON, supra note 85, at 14 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
122 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1477; Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 3. Of course, 
Behavioral Law and Economics has been the subject of critique on a variety of axes. See, e.g., Richard 
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552 
(1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, 64 ALA. L. REV. 389, 394-96 (2012) [hereinafter 
Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics]; Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and 
Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws. and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 1033, (2012). 
123 Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW J, 3 (Eyal Zamir & Daron Teichman eds., 2014); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 
I 055-56; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1168 (2003). 
124 Other scholars characterize this phenomenon as "extra-rational." See Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
Amanda R. Carrico, & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
715, 720 (2011). 
125 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1075. 
126 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics 12 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 12879, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2879; Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1476; 
Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 4 (stating the third bound that deviates from standard 
economic models is that of bounded self-control or willpower). 
127 On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble. Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and 
Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2122 (2008); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1161. 
128 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1069. 
129Id. 
130 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1476. 
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situations. 131 In all these ways, real people frequently act in ways that deviate from 
the predictions of rational choice theory for homo economicus. 132 
Thus, behavioral economics establishes that rather than making flawless 
decisions that accurately reflect our preferences and optimize our goals, we often 
diverge from perfect rationality in systematic ways. 133 Building on these insights, 
behavioral economics seeks to supplement traditional economic modeling and 
predictions with more realistic and accurate assumptions about human behavior 
gleaned from social science. 134 In other words, behavioral economics is 
concerned with the ways in which humans differ from homo economicus. 135 
Behavioral economics looks to cognitive psychology to help unpack the 
mechanics of our imperfect rationality, examining the contexts in which these 
missteps play out, why we are prone to make them, and how we commit them. 
In what contexts do we deviate from perfect rationality? Behavioral 
economics classifies bounded rationality into one of two basic categories: 
judgment errors, and choices or decisions that deviate from expected utility. 136 
Estimating the frequency, magnitude, and/or probability of uncertain events is a 
central component of economic decision-making. 137 Judgment is the process by 
which people estimate the likelihood of various outcomes, 138 thereby forming 
beliefs about probability. 139 We then use judgments to value different outcomes 
and ultimately make choices, or decisions. 14° Choice or decision-making is the 
131 See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text. 
132 BEHAVIORAL LA w & ECONOMICS I (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 
1217-18; Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 199-200, 
203 (2006); Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1474. 
133 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 5; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2003) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Uncertain]; Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Storrs lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L. J. 1826, 1831 
(2013); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1162. But see Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 
1168 (counseling against over application of judgment errors). 
134 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 7; Jolls et al., supra note I IO, at 1473-74, 1487; Camerer et al., supra 
note 85, at 1215; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1057; Jolls, supra note 126, at 2. 
135 See Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 1-2 (discussing the relationship between homo 
economicus and real people). 
136 See Jolls, supra note 126, at IO; Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1447; Mullainathan & Thaler, supra 
note 112, at 4; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1168. Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, 
at 22; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1170. (discussing how likewise, Behavioral Decision 
theory classifies its research into the categories of judgment and choice.). 
137 REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 88 (2009); Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 
114, at 9. 
138 Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 9; Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1480. 
139 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1480; Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 4. 
140 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1477-78. 
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process by which we value different outcomes and select from among various 
paths, 141 taking into account any relevant judgments we may have formed. 142 
When people make systematic judgment errors, poor choices are likely to result, 
even if they have the information and incentives to make good ones. 143 
Why do we deviate from perfect rationality? We have limited cognitive 
capacities and live in a complicated world. 144 We often face judgments and 
decisions fraught with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. 145 As they become 
more complex, acting according to our predicted utility requires increasing 
cognitive effort. 146 Yet we are limited in our attention spans, calculation 
capabilities, and memories. We are further limited in time, willpower, and 
emotional capacity. 147 We are incapable of optimally processing information in 
all contexts. 148 
How do we deviate from perfect rationality? Our cognitive response to this 
complexity is to develop simplifying strategies. We develop what we might think 
of as a cognitive toolbox of shortcuts. 149 When confronted with a decision for 
which judgment is required, people select a tool suited to that judgment. 150 In the 
judgment and decision-making literature, these simplifying tools are known as 
heuristics. 151 The etiology of the term derives from mathematics and computer 
science, which distinguish between the complex and often inefficient algorithms 
that guarantee accurate results, and heuristics, which are more efficient methods 
of answering the same problems, but with greater likelihood of inaccuracy. 152 
Heuristics are best understood as mental shortcuts or "rules ofthumb" 153-hard-
141 Id. 
142 Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 9-10. 
143 Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1166. 
144 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2136; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1069 (arguing 
bounded rationality stems from the high costs of processing information, limited cognition, or both). 
145 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1076. 
146 See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 22; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at I 078; Rachlinski, Selling 
Heuristics, supra note 122, at 394. 
147 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2136. 
148 See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 7, 37; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1076; see also 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 19-105 (expanding these insights by identifying two separate decision-
making processes: System 1 (which is intuitive, emotional, and simplistic) and System 2 (which is 
deliberative, rule-based, and rational)). 
149 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 88; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1143. 
150 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 73. 
151 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at I 143; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1165. 
152 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 88. 
153 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 3; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at I 076; 
Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, supra note 122, at 390. 
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wired processes that are virtually automatic and occur with little conscious 
effort. 154 Some common examples include our ability to recognize a previously 
experienced situation (the availability heuristic) and our ability to judge 
similarities between situations (the representativeness heuristic). 155 Heuristics are 
often useful and effective, providing fast, rough-and-ready approximations when 
time and cognition are limited. 156 But like the mathematic processes on which 
they are based, heuristics can also lead to systematic miscalculations. 157 
At the same time, escalating complexity increases the potential for us to fall 
prey to bias in our cognitive tasks, leading to inaccurate judgments and 
decisions. 158 Biases are deviations from the normative predictions of utility 
maximization. 159 And because they are systematic and predictable in certain 
circumstances, behavioral economics have given them diagnostic labels. 160 
Examples of cognitive bias include our tendency to believe our risk of a poor 
outcome is lower than it actually is (optimism bias), our impatience for short-term 
as opposed to long-term rewards (time inconsistency), our tendency to select the 
status quo or default option (status quo bias), and our tendency to place a greater 
negative value on losses than we place positive value on equivalent gains (loss 
aversion). Relatedly, prospect theory predicts that when making decisions about 
uncertain outcomes, we are more likely to evaluate those outcomes based on their 
predicted departure from an initial reference point, rather than on the costs and 
benefits of the outcomes themselves. 161 We are thus "biased" in favor of initial 
reference points, which renders our ultimate decisions less accurate. Our 
proclivity toward bias can color our judgments and muddle our decisions. 
In sum, behavioral economics posits that because of our reliance on heuristics 
and our vulnerability to bias, we will form judgments and make decisions in 
imperfectly rational ways, exhibiting decision-making anomalies-patterns of 
judgment and choice that are inconsistent with rational choice theory. This insight 
broadens the universe of potential market failure considerably. As is the case 
when market conditions diverge from standard assumptions, when human 
154 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 87; NUDGE, supra note 13, at 44. 
155 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 87. 
156 Id. at 88; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 11. 
157 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 23; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 11; Jolls, Sunstein, & 
Thaler, supra note 110, at 1477; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1076. 
158 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 3; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 204; 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1085. 
159 KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 4; Baron, supra note 123, at 5-6. 
16° KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 4. 
161 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 205; 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1069. 
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behavior diverges from the assumptions of perfect rationality, the market operates 
sub-optimally, 162 leading to a sort of behavioral market failure. 163 Similar to our 
understanding of conventional market failure, behavioral market failure 
represents a departure from market efficiency, but this time driven by the ways in 
which assumptions about human behavior, rather than market conditions, prove 
to be imprecise. 164 
Once we recognize many of our judgments and decisions are imperfectly 
rational, it becomes clear that market failure is far more pervasive than 
conventional economic modeling would predict. 165 I now tum to examine the 
operation of heuristics and biases in the childcare market, and offer a theory of 
the behavioral market failure that results. 
B. Theorizing Behavioral Failures in the Childcare Market 
Behavioral economics provides insight into how and why people, including 
parents, miscalculate in market and non-market settings. 166 Of course, to say that 
parents are imperfect isn't news to anyone with children. For present purposes, 
the important point is that in forming judgments and making decisions about 
childcare, parents will likely be prone to the same types of departures from 
rationality that others make in other contexts. 
A central contribution of behavioral economics is to theoretically predict and 
empirically confirm that people often experience a difference between their 
"decision utility" and "experienced utility,"-that is to say, a difference between 
the welfare they think they will reap from a particular decision, and the welfare 
they actually receive after making this decision. 167 Given the disconnect between 
the statistically high number of parents who rate childcare quality as a central 
priority168 and the overall low quality of care demanded in the market, it seems 
162 See Brigitte C. Madrian, Applying Insights From Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 6 ANN. 
REV. ECON. 663, 664-65 (2014). 
163 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1832, 1842. Professor Sunstein has developed a helpful taxonomy of 
behavioral market failures that act as adjuncts to the standard market failures of traditional economic 
theory. Id. at 1842. In exercising judgment and making decisions, people are prone to commit four 
basic types of mistakes: (I) we exhibit a bias toward present action and make short-term decisions that 
are inconsistent with long-terms goals; (2) we overlook important information in making decisions; 
(3) we exhibit unrealistic optimism regarding the possibility of poor outcomes; and (4) we have 
difficulty assessing the probability of alternative outcomes. Id. at 1842-1852. But see Amir & Lobel, 
supra note 127, at 2125 (explaining that many problems diagnosed in Nudge can be explained by 
externalities and third-party effects). 
164 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1215. 
165 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1484. 
166 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 19. 
167 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1875; see generally ARIELY, supra note 12; NUDGE, supra note 13. 
168 See supra notes 2-3, and accompanying text. 
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likely that at least some parents' childcare judgments and decisions are not 
maximizing their expected utility. 169 Although the empirical data on childcare 
decision-making is still developing, 170 the information we do have suggests this 
is the case. But before exploring these findings in detail, I first consider a unique 
feature of childcare decision-making: the fact that there are multiple "decision 
targets" for childcare choices. 
1. Decisions for Self versus Others 
As discussed above, childcare decisions are at once intended to benefit 
children, parents, and the family as a whole. In other words, the decision targets 
are multiple-parents are choosing not only for their children, but also for 
themselves, and for their families overall. Thus, childcare decisions differ in 
important ways from judgments and decisions individuals make only for 
themselves. 
Psychologists have only recently begun to study the differences between 
decisions for self versus others, and the literature on "self-other" decision-making 
and its implications for cognitive bias is nascent. 171 But scholars have established 
that cognitive biases often operate differently when deciding for someone other 
than oneself, 172 with some cognitive biases amplified173 and others diminished. 174 
169 See supra note 5. Other forces are also at work. Parents reports themselves may be inaccurate. For 
example, their reported preferences may have already been altered to conform to social norms, or 
parents may respond to hypothetical questions by incorporating assumptions that affect their reported 
preferences. See Justine S. Hastings, Richard Van Weelden, & Jeffrey Weinstein, Preferences, 
Information, and Parental Choice Behavior in Public School Choice 5 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12995, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 2995. 
170 Indeed, one of the implications of my work here is that childcare decision-making warrants 
increased empirical study in the social sciences, so that we can best design law and policy initiatives 
to enhance and support parental decision-making. See CHAUDRY, ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (outlining 
potential areas of new research and synthesis of existing research on childcare decision-making); 
FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 12 (describing how literature on childcare decision-making is 
underdeveloped); id. at 31-32 (suggesting potential studies to consider the operation of heuristics and 
biases in childcare decision-making). 
171 Evan Pol man, Effects of Self-Other Decision Making on Regulatory Focus and Choice Overload, 
102 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 980, 990 (2012) [hereinafter Polman, Regulatory Focus]; 
Evan Po Iman, lriformation Distortion in Self-Other Decision Making, 46 J. EXPERIMENT AL Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 432, 435 (2010) [hereinafter Polman, Information Distortion]. 
172 Chung-Chau Chang et al., The Compromise Effect in Choosing for Others, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 109, 110--11 (2012); Lu et al., supra note 94, at 145; Polman, Information Distortion, supra 
note 171, at 432; Peter A. Ube! et al., Physicians Recommend Different Treatments for Patients Than 
They Would Choose for Themselves, 17 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 630, 630 (2011 ). 
173 Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 980 (describing omission bias, confirmation bias, 
lexicographic weighting, and predecisional distortion as greater when deciding for another; greater 
risk aversion in some contexts). 
174 Id. at 980 (describing the decreased risk aversion in some contexts); Evan Polman, Self-Other 
Decision Making And Loss Aversion 119 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 141, 143, 148 
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Still other biases may be more or less prevalent depending on context. 175 The 
variability of cognitive biases in self-other decision-making isn't yet fully 
understood. 176 What is more, the operation of self-other decision-making likely 
differs depending on whom the decision target is, and how psychologically 
proximate or distant that target is from the decider. 177 Parents are psychologically 
close to their children, but no research has systematically examined how parents' 
decisions for their children differ from decisions for themselves. 178 And of special 
interest here, childcare decisions are made both for parents themselves and for 
others (their children and families). 
A full exploration of the implications of self-other decision-making is beyond 
the scope of this Article, and would be premature given the still-evolving research. 
For the purposes of this project, the important point is that despite these variances, 
research on childcare decision-making suggests that parents are, indeed, 
vulnerable to heuristics and biases, and exhibit them in childcare judgments and 
decisions. Having flagged the issue of self-other decision-making, I now tum to 
explore prominent heuristics and biases that likely interact with childcare 
judgments and decisions, and theorize how they might lead to behavioral market 
failure in the childcare market. 
2. Childcare Quality Judgments 
Before making childcare decisions, parents and families form judgments 
about the likelihood that particular providers will supply quality childcare. This 
isn't unusual; people frequently are called upon to form judgments based on the 
likelihood that one or another eventuality will come to pass. 179 But when 
heuristics and biases interact with judgment tasks, people sometimes make too of 
(2012) [hereinafter Polman, Loss Aversion] (describing decreased omissions bias and reduced loss 
aversion, respectively). 
175 Chang et al., supra note 172, at 110; Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 980 (noting the 
level of risk aversion in choosing for others varies by context); Polman, Information Distortion, supra 
note 171, at 432. 
176 Polman, Loss Aversion, supra note 174, at 148; Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 980. 
177 Chang et al., supra note 172, at 111; Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, A Fundamental 
Prediction Error: Se/j:Others Discrepancies in Risk Preference, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 45, 
52 (1997); Lu et al., supra note 94, at 145; Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 990; Fenja 
V. Ziegler & Richard J. Tunney, Decisions/or Others Become Less Impulsive the Further Away They 
Are on the Family Tree, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 2, 4 (2012) (describing the relationship between decision-
maker and decision target can affect optimality of decisions). 
178 Rebecca A. Dore et al., A Social Values Analysis of Parental Decision Making, 148 J. PSYCHOL.: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND APPLIED 477, 478 (2014). 
179 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1085. "To accurately predict the probability of future events, 
actors must consider the statistical probability that an event will occur and 'update' (adjust) this 'base 
rate' with any available particularized information about a specific situation." Id. 
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much certain information while overlooking or ignoring other important data. 180 
This distorts judgments of likelihood and probability and can dramatically slant 
people's appreciation of risk. 181 Here, I survey several of the most common 
heuristics and biases, and consider their potential impact on childcare quality 
judgments. 
a. Availability and Representativeness 
The availability heuristic affects how easily certain events come to mind. 182 
Relying on availability, we access information that is easily recalled, forming a 
judgment of likelihood based on salience. 183 People tend to access and use 
information that is recent, well-known, and vivid. 184 Thus, we base our 
assessments of frequency or likelihood on the ease with which we can retrieve 
examples from memory. 185 When it goes awry, this heuristic can lead us to 
overestimate the frequency or likelihood of the most vivid events while 
underestimating others. 186 
The representativeness heuristic works similarly. Using this rule of thumb, 
people make judgments of frequency or likelihood based on observed similarities 
between the subject of judgment and a reference or target category. 187 In lockstep 
with availability, the representativeness heuristic may cause people to 
overestimate the likelihood that something actually is what it appears to be. 188 
As a result of these two heuristics, data that is vivid, salient, common, or 
familiar is more easily recalled and compared. 189 Excessive reliance on available 
or representative data causes people to overlook or ignore other, less salient (but 
important) information. 190 Rather than optimal processing of information, 
availability and representativeness can lead to faulty estimations of likelihood, 
resulting in inaccurate judgments about risk. 191 When market actors make 
180 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1846. 
181 Id. at 1851. 
182 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 203--04. 
183 Id.; Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, supra note 122, at 392-93, 400; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra 
note 133, at 1170. 
184 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 25; Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, supra note 122, at 400; Rachlinski, 
Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1170. 
185 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 89; Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 10. 
186 Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, supra note 122, at 392-93. 
187 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 26; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at I 171. 
188 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 10; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1086. 
189 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1086-87. 
190 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1846. 
191 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 5. 
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systematic miscalculations of risk, the market itself becomes distorted because it 
does not reflect the true preferences of these actors. 192 
When confronting childcare options, parents must make assessments about 
the likelihood that their children will receive high quality care, low quality care, 
or even experience harm. In predicting these eventualities, availability and 
representativeness may come into play. For example, based on a highly publicized 
event of harm at an institutional childcare center, parents might judge the risk of 
harm to be higher at childcare centers, as opposed to, say, smaller, childcare home 
environments. 193 In reality, studies show that on average, center-based care is 
much more likely to be licensed, is safer, and is of higher quality than childcare 
homes. 194 
Parents may also make categorical judgments about quality based on 
perceived similarities to a reference or target category. Relying on 
representativeness, they may judge quality using other proxies like orderliness, 
cleanliness, or resemblance to another provider known to be of high quality. 195 
Some parents value providers who are "'parent-like"' and seem to '"love 
children"' 196-providers who exhibit similar values and discipline styles. 197 Or 
they might judge childcare homes to be of higher quality because they're more 
"home-like,"-intimate, nurturing, and therefore of higher quality than larger, 
institutional childcare centers. 198 In one recent survey, for example, parents 
reported basing childcare decisions on their perceptions of the aspects of care they 
could recognize easily through observation and conversations with the caregiver, 
such as warmth and cleanliness. 199 Parents may use these features to gauge quality 
rather than the more formal measures used by experts. 200 (Of course, cleanliness 
and warmth can be consistent with higher-quality care, but their existence is no 
192 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 25; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1191-92. 
193 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 12. 
194 See CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, 51-62. In a different situation, however, the 
opposite might be true. 
195 See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 13; Laura Stout Sosinsky, Childcare Markets in the US: 
Supply and Demand, Quality and Cost, and Public Policy, in CHILDCARE MARKETS: CAN THEY 
DELIVER AN EQUITABLE SERVICE? 131, 142 (Eva Lloyd & Helen Penn, eds., 2012);see also MANFRA 
ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (parents see foam ground covers beneath playground equipment and perceive 
safety; experts see danger because the equipment has no mechanism for preventing falls); 
NACCRRA, WHAT DO PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 9 (clean and friendly heard repeatedly in 
focus groups investigating what parents look for in childcare arrangements). 
196 MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 31. 
197 Raikes et al., Parent Perceptions, supra note 4, at 18. 
198 Cf Plantenga, supra note 14, at 70. 
199 See, e.g., NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 8-9, 13-14. 
200 Plantenga, supra note 14, at 70. 
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guarantee.) Similarly, high demand may act as a proxy for quality. One study 
found parents viewed providers with substantial waitlist to be of high quality.201 
At the other end of the spectrum, some parents underestimate quality simply 
because of the neighborhood in which a childcare provider is situated, assuming 
quality must be low. 202 Or parents might associate childcare centers with lower 
quality because they are for profit, judging them to be "supermarket childcare," 
as opposed to non-profit and/or community linked providers. 203 And finally, 
parents' judgments are further complicated because the measures of quality most 
frequently relied upon by experts-structural quality-are themselves proxies for 
the more predictive but elusive quality measure: process quality. 204 
b. Overoptimism and Self serving Bias 
People tend to make cognitive inferences that are self-serving.205 Often, we 
will interpret information or form judgments in ways that either confirm 
preconceptions or otherwise serve our interests. 206 When subject to these biases, 
we will respond more readily to desired, rather than unwanted, information. 207 
This in turn distorts appreciation of risk and estimations of probability, leading us 
to take unjustifiable risks. 208 
Unrealistic optimism is one of the most recognized self-serving biases. Most 
of us believe we're "above average," 209 less likely to suffer from poor choices or 
bad outcomes than are others. 210 Yet, as Professors Korobkin and Ulen wryly 
observe, "[n]otwithstanding Garrison Keillor's report, all the children in Lake 
Wobegon cannot really be above average."211 When people are overly optimistic, 
201 MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 32 (citing an Australian study). 
202 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 25. 
203 MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 32-33 (citing an Australian study). 
204 See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
205 Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1172. 
206 See Jolls, supra note 126, at 14; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1093; Sunstein, supra note 
133, at 1849; BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 8; Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky 
Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and 
Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 746-47 (2009). 
201 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1851; Williams, supra note 206, at 746-47. 
208 Jolls, supra note 126, at 13-14; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 204--05; Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 113, at 1086-87; Williams, supra note 206, at 742-45. 
209 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 32; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1849. 
210 See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 4; Jolls, supra note 126, at 13; Jolls & 
Sunstein, supra note 132, at 204; Jolls et al., supra note II 0, at 1524, 1541; Korobkin & Ulen, supra 
note 113, at 1091; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1172-73; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 
1848-49. 
211 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1091. 
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they underestimate risk and fail to take sufficient care to protect against poor 
outcomes. 212 Thus, overoptimism is at the root of individual risk-taking, 
particularly in the context of life and health. 213 Related to overoptimism is 
overconfidence: we overestimate our ability to make accurate judgments.214 This 
can exacerbate the effects of our flawedjudgments. 215 
These biases appear to impact judgments about childcare quality. There is a 
tendency among parents to rate the care their children receive highly-much more 
so than expert observers.216 In one study of parents as childcare consumers, for 
example, authors hypothesized something like overoptimism was at work: 
It is possible that parents rate the quality of their children's 
programs not according to their assessment of reality, but 
according to their hopes and desires for their much loved 
children. Not knowing the whole story about what actually 
happens to their children in child care, since they are rarely 
present to find out, parents might assume that the most 
important things are really being provided for their children. 217 
A later study found that in addition to overestimating their children's care, 
parents assign higher quality scores to aspects of care they believe to be more 
important. 218 Still another sociologist studying childcare surmised that 
consumers' propensity to assess social services favorably may explain the 
tendency of parents to judge childcare quality as high, despite indications to the 
contrary.219 These judgments tend to confirm parents' beliefs about quality and 
serve their interests by reassuring themselves that their children are well cared for. 
As a result of these bias, parents, like other consumers, may underestimate 
the risk that a childcare provider might not provide quality care. 22° Consequently, 
parents may pay insufficient attention to issues of quality and safety, opting for 
212 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 32-33; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 207; Sunstein, supra note 
133, at 1849. 
213 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 32; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1187. 
214 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 32; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1172-73. 
215 Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1211. 
216 See Cryer, et al., supra note 2, at 274; MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 19; NA CCR RA, PARENTS' 
PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 15. 
217 Cryer & Burchinal, supra note 4, at 55. 
218 See Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 274-75. Study authors conclude that parents' trust may be 
subjective, making it difficult to judge the level of care their children actually receive. Id. at 275. 
219 BROWNE MILLER, supra note 2, at 199-201. 
220 Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1179-80. 
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unlicensed or subpar care but reassuring themselves that nothing bad will happen 
to their children. 
In sum, the operation of heuristics and biases in childcare judgment creates 
opportunities for parents to overlook important data and misjudge the quality of 
providers. 221 And errors in judgment can prejudice their decision-making process. 
3. Childcare Decisions 
After forming judgments about the available quality from various providers, 
parents must weigh their options and choose among them. As just discussed, 
parents' use of heuristics may lead them to form inaccurate judgments about the 
quality provided by particular caregivers. And as they begin the decision-making 
process, additional interactions with heuristics and biases may further complicate 
things. What's more, heuristics and biases not only impact initial decisions. from 
among competing options, but also subsequent decisions that weigh whether to 
make a change. Below, I consider these phenomena in the context of the childcare 
market. 
a. Present Bias 
People often make decisions that have consequences over time, requmng 
them to compare short- and long-term costs and benefits. 222 Many important life 
decisions-educational investments, labor supply, health and diet-exhibit this 
characteristic. 223 According to the standard economic account, people should 
make these decisions in ways that reflect their long-term preferences and goals.224 
Behavioral economics demonstrates that to the contrary, because of bias and 
bounded self-control, people exhibit behavior that is "dynamically 
inconsistent": 225 They sometimes make short-term decisions that are actually 
inconsistent with their long-term goals.226 
When making decisions about investment goods like education, labor, health, 
and diet, people tend to invest too little in the short term. 227 These problems are 
especially acute when there exists the possibility of a small short-term gain at the 
expense of longer-term losses.228 People are biased toward present rewards, and 
221 When availability, representativeness, and over-opttm1sm work in tandem, people may 
underestimate risk significantly. NUDGE, supra note 13, at 31-32. 
222 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1119. 
223 Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 26. 
224 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
225 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 41. 
226 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1843. 
227 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 73. 
228 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1843. 
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discount the potential longer-term benefits of alternative choices. 229 A primary 
driver of this time inconsistency is "hyperbolic discounting."230 This bias leads 
people to make shortsighted decisions in favor of immediate costs or benefits 
rather than those that are more remote. 231 
Problems of present bias and time inconsistency seem likely to be a partial 
cause of the low demand for quality childcare. Many of childcare's short-term 
benefits are related to affordability, convenience, and facilitating parental work 
outside the home. By contrast, quality-related costs and benefits tend to be 
cumulative and more apparent in the longer-term. 232 Because so many parents 
desperately need childcare in order to work, market demand that privileges 
availability and convenience over quality suggests present bias may be at work. 
In the absence of such bias, and assuming adequate resources, some parents might 
channel more financial resources toward investments in quality care. For yet 
another cohort of parents, present bias is eclipsed by economic reality: 
notwithstanding their preferences for higher quality care, their choices ultimately 
are constrained by what they can afford. 
b. Salience 
Recall that one of the central insights of prospect theory is that, rather than 
evaluating choices based on costs and benefits, we often evaluate them according 
to their relationship to a fixed reference point. 233 In other words, choices are made 
in context and through a process of comparison. 234 When making comparisons to 
a reference point, a cognitive process similar to the availability heuristic plays out. 
As with forming judgments, when making decisions, cognitive limitations prevent 
people from fully accounting for all available information in making comparisons. 
Instead, people direct their attention to what their minds focus on-what is most 
salient. 235 People may respond more strongly to salient data and overlook less 
prominent, but still important, data. 236 Consumers may thus place too much 
229 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2115. 
230 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1539; Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 11. 
231 Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 23; NUDGE, supra note 13, at 73; Jolls et al., supra 
note 110, at 1539. 
232 Sosinsky, supra note 195, at 144. 
233 See supra text accompanying note 155. 
234 Pedro Bordalo et al., Salience and Consumer Choice 40 (Nat') Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17947, 2012) [hereinafter Bordalo, Consumer Choice]. 
235 See BAR-GILL, supra note 13, at 91; Bordalo, Consumer Choice, supra note 234, at 3; Pedro 
Bordalo et al., Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk 1-2 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 16387, 2010) [hereinafter Borda lo, Salience Theory]; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1846. 
236 See Bordalo, Consumer Choice, supra note 234, at I, 40. 
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weight on the most salient attributes of a service, overlooking other important 
features. 237 
Childcare decision-making is a complex task and presents a number of 
variables for parents to weigh: location, hours, price, licensing, type of provider, 
and quality. Yet parents may have limited time during which to select childcare. 238 
Certain features of childcare may be more salient, namely price and convenience, 
because those are the aspects of childcare with which parents interact most 
frequently, and because many families struggle to afford childcare.239 By contrast, 
the positive and negative externalities generated by childcare quality are 
frequently hidden or not realized until later, making them less visible for parents 
to consider when selecting childcare.24° Further, the aspects of choice can vary 
depending on whether the decision target is the parent (in which case, they are 
more likely to focus on feasibility-whether the means of achieving a particular 
choice are relatively easy) or the child (in which case, they are more likely to 
focus on desirability-the value ofa choice's end state). 241 These salience effects 
may cause some parents to over-emphasize some prominent features of childcare 
while overlooking more critical indicia of quality, leading them to select childcare 
that doesn't necessarily reflect the quality they desire. 
c. Conformity and Social Norms 
People have a tendency to conform-to do as others do. 242 They are 
influenced by information about the choices others are making. 243 Especially 
when people lack sufficient information, they may simply follow what other 
people seem to think-whatever appears to be the most common or desirable 
option.244 Thus, social networks can be important sources of information and can 
have normative influence over individual preferences and decisions.245 Moreover, 
in the context of deciding for others, social values theory predicts that such 
decisions will be affected by a social norm expressing how people should decide 
237 Id. at 2-3. 
238 See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 12. 
239 For a significant number of parents, of course, price moves beyond being simply salient to being 
ultimately determinative of the quality they demand. 
240 See, e.g., Deborah Lowe Vandell et. al., Do Ejjects of Early Child Care Extend to Age 15 Years? 
Results from the N!CHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development, 81 CHILD DEV. 737, 73 7-
55 (20 I 0) (tracking effects of childcare quality ten years after completion of that care). 
241 Lu et al., supra note 94, at 144-46. 
242 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 55. 
24J Id. at 288. 
244 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 9; NUDGE, supra note 13, at 59. 
245 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 17' 19' 26. 
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for others. 146 Research on parental decision-making for children has found that 
parental decisions are in fact influenced by what they perceive their peer groups 
to value. 247 
In the context of childcare decision-making, social networks and 
communities play a significant role in childcare choice. With little information 
about childcare, generally, or their children's care, specifically, parents may 
simply go with what they know rather than engaging in a careful weighing of 
options, costs, and benefits.248 When facing these challenges, the default or status 
quo exerts a powerful pull. 249 Parents are likely to go with what they know, 
focusing on their own experiences, that of friends and family, and whatever is 
prevalent in their communities.250 Indeed, personal referrals are one of the most 
common methods of locating childcare. 251 Particular communities may have 
established norms preferring particular types of childcare, which will in tum 
influence individual families in those communities to choose what they perceive 
others in their community to be choosing. One could imagine any number of 
community norms, e.g.: infants should always be cared for in small, home-like 
environments; institutional care is important for toddlers because of socialization 
and cognitive development; Head Start is an important precursor of school 
readiness; or family members are always the best choice for childcare. 252 
Studies confirm this intuition: Most parents begin childcare searches with 
information from informal sources such as friends, family, and neighbors, and 
ninety percent of them report learning about childcare from sources other than 
formal resource and referral agencies. 253 Similarly, immigrant populations tend to 
prefer childcare that is consistent with the culture and values represented by their 
countries of origin, rather than American childcare norms and preferences. 254 
Conforming to social norms and relying on communities for information 
makes sense as a strategy for gathering information about childcare, and may 
enhance childcare decisions and channel parents toward quality care. But, as is 
the case more generally, reliance on these proxies may also cause parents to 
246 Dore et al., supra note 178, at 478-79. 
247 Id. at 481. 
248 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 201. 
249 See id. at 200-01. 
25° CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 12-13. So, for example, if many friends and family rely on a 
local YMCA for care, parents in the selection process may be more likely to enroll their children in 
the same facility because it is more salient and well-known to them. Id. at 12. 
251 Parent Perceptions, supra note 4, at 4, 19. 
252 See, e.g., CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 19. 
253 FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 13, 25; Sosinsky, supra note 195, at 142. 
254 FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 20-21. 
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overlook more reliable data on quality or simplify their searches in ways that 
undercut their ultimate goals. 
d. Status Quo Bias 
Cognitive biases also deter people from making changes that would 
maximize their expected utility. Because of status quo bias, people are much more 
likely adhere to existing choices than to make changes.255 
In part, this is because we are loss averse-reluctant to surrender things we 
already have.256 We tend to place a greater negative value on losses than we would 
place positive value on equivalent gains.257 Like the status quo bias, loss aversion 
may impede us from making changes, even when those changes would increase 
our utility. Status quo bias and loss aversion contribute to inertia, a reluctance to 
make changes even when in our interests. 258 People also tend to procrastinate, 
incorrectly assuming they will take beneficial actions in the future. 259 
Complicating these biases, people have bounded willpower. 26° Consequently, 
they either put off or fail to take steps that would further their long-term goals.261 
Status quo bias, loss aversion, and procrastination may discourage parents 
from changing childcare providers, even in the face concerns about safety or 
quality. Parents will tend to prefer what they already have, or persist with the 
default arrangement.262 Indeed, several studies report that in general, parents have 
little interest in changing providers. 263 When weighing a change, a parent 
exhibiting loss aversion would give more weight to what she might miss about the 
existing arrangement than what she might gain from a new one. 264 This may be 
the case even if the existing arrangement is of marginal quality and the prospective 
provider has the potential for better quality. 265 Complicating status quo bias, 
255 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132; NUDGE, supra note 13, at 7-8, 34; Camerer et 
al., supra note 85, at 1224. 
256 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 33-34. 
257 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 6; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, 
at 3; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1111. 
258 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 7-8, 35; Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1224. 
259 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1225; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1843. 
260 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 41-42; Jolls, supra note 126, at 15-16; Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 
1539. 
261 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1845. 
262 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 14-15. 
263 See MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 16. 
264 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 14. 
265 /d.at14-15. 
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parents may be resistant to change because of countervailing concerns about 
stability for their children or their families. 266 
In sum, it appears that in some instances heuristics and biases work together 
to distort initial judgments and ultimate decisions in the childcare market, likely 
causing some parents' childcare decisions to diverge from the predictions of 
rational choice theory. Imperfect rationality leads to distorted market behavior 
and, consequently, distorts the childcare market in which that behavior takes 
place. Thus, behavioral market failure is one explanation for the low demand for 
quality in our childcare market. 
An important insight from behavioral economics is that the existence of 
behavioral market failure can inform the state's role. Enter the "nudge." 
C. Behavioral Market Failure and the State: Introducing Nudges 
When markets are inefficient, most economic theorists acknowledge that 
government intervention can enhance efficiency.267 This is true for behavioral, as 
well as standard, market failure. 268 
This reality necessarily has implications for state intervention. Legal rules 
and policies can influence behavior and affect the production of social resources 
and their efficient allocation.269 Behavioralists argue that to the extent legal rules 
and policies are designed in part based on their anticipated effects on behavior, 
they ought to be informed by the contexts in which people actually form 
judgments and make decisions.27° Considering the contexts in which people form 
judgements and make decision ought to facilitate a closer nexus between people's 
ends and means, 271 enhancing market efficiency and overall welfare. 272 When 
grounded in a more sophisticated account of how people actually make decisions, 
public policy, governance, and lawmaking can be improved. 273 
266 Plantenga, supra note 14, at 72. 
267 See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 184-86; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, 2109-10; Harbach, 
Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 686-87. 
268 See Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1888. Indeed, some scholars argue that many of the interventions 
prescribed in books like Nudge can be explained in terms of externalities and third-party effects. Amir 
& Lobel, supra note 127, at 2125. 
269 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at I 054, 1074-75. 
210 See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 2; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 
2099; Jolls, supra note 126, at 5; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 200; Jolls et al., supra note 110, 
at 1522; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1054, I 099, 1104. 
271 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1104. 
272 See Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1195 ("To the extent that private preferences reflect 
systematic miscalculations and mistakes, however, the aggregation of these preferences will create 
undesirable results."); Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1836. 
273 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2127. 
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Armed with an understanding of the limits of human cognition in judgment 
and decision-making, law and policy can be formulated to "debias" people's 
imperfect rationality274 and steer them in welfare-promoting directions, 275 thereby 
increasing efficiency. 276 In perhaps the most prominent and accessible 
characterization of this approach, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have 
introduced the concept of the nudge. 277 Nudges readjust the decision-making 
context (a/k/a "choice architecture") so as to steer people toward decisions that 
better reflect their true preferences. 278 "Choice architects" (i.e., policymakers) 
structure the contexts in which people make decisions in ways that account for 
imperfect rationality and self-control, improving efficiency and, ideally, 
maximizing welfare. 279 Nudges are intended to be modest and inexpensive, 
leaving room for individual agency and choice.280 Importantly, nudges are never 
compulsory. As defined by Sunstein and Thaler, a nudge is "any aspect of choice 
architecture that alters people's behaviors in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives."281 
Certain features of judgment and decision-making contexts make it more or 
less likely that they will be affected by bounded rationality and bounded self-
control. Most broadly, people fall prey to cognitive errors when decisions are 
complex, ambiguous, and difficult, and information is lacking. 282 Experience, 
frequency, and feedback also matter, because difficult decisions become easier 
with practice and people can learn from mistakes when feedback is clear and 
immediate.283 Bounded self-control is most likely to pose problems when people 
274 Jolls, supra note 126, at 34; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 200, 202. 
275 See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 1 O; Jolls, supra note 126, at 1-2; Jolls & 
Sunstein, supra note 132, at 199; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1159, 1162. 
276 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1223. 
277 See generally NUDGE, supra note 13. 
278 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 10; see also Baron, supra note 123, at 5. 
279 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 3, 6; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2106-07. 
280 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2106-08, 2118; Jolls & Sunstein, 
supra note 132, at 234. 
281 See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2118. But see Ryan Bubb & 
Richard Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1599 
(2014) (critiquing Behavioral Law and Economics's restriction to choice-preserving policy 
interventions). 
282 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 74; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1076-78, 1083; Rachlinski, 
Selling Heuristics, supra note 122, at 393. 
283 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 74-75; Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 4; Rachlinski, 
Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1220; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1163. Earlier experiences 
and decisions with childcare thus become part of the context in which parents make subsequent 
childcare choices. WEBER, supra note 16, at 7. 
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experience some benefits immediately and other consequences later, 284 and they 
may also arise when people are in a "hot" state. 285 
The context and characteristics of the childcare market create the background 
conditions for imperfect rationality. First, childcare decisions are complex ones 
in which parents must evaluate, among other things, the type of care, availability, 
cost, convenience, and quality. Quality is one factor among many they must 
weigh. The average parent has little information about how to locate quality 
childcare. 286 Moreover, information about quality is hidden and sometimes 
ambiguous. 287 As discussed above, parents are unlikely to receive substantial 
feedback concerning quality because they are unable to observe directly whether 
the care their children are receiving is, in fact, of high quality. Childcare quality 
is also notoriously difficult to measure and report. We may know what poor or 
unsafe childcare looks like when we see it, but assessing high quality is more 
difficult. 
Second, many first time parents will have little to no experience choosing 
childcare, and are unlikely to accumulate significant information moving forward. 
Families will likely face childcare decisions with relative infrequency because of 
status quo bias and a tendency to prefer stability and consistency in childcare 
arrangements. 288 
And finally, the short-term benefits of childcare tend to be basic safety, 
convenience, facilitation of parental work, and affordability. By contrast, the most 
significant benefits and costs of childcare quality tend to accumulate over time. 
In all these ways, childcare decision-making presents a powerful case for 
debiasing: Parents could use a nudge toward higher-quality care.289 
284 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 73. 
285 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 41-42, 76-77; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1188. 
286 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 671, 684-85. 
287 See Plantenga, supra note 14, at 70. 
288 See id. at 72. Of course, most families will make childcare decisions more than once-when they 
change jobs or work schedules, when children age out of particular categories of care, or when changes 
in subsidy policy necessitate a switch. WEBER, supra note 16, at 7. 
289 Recognizing valuable insights of behavioral economics for law and policymaking, the 
Administration for Children and Families (a division of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services), has begun initial, theoretical work to study the potential for behavioral reforms to 
enhance structural family law and policy in the context of childcare policymaking, child support, 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families policy, and domestic violence. See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 9-17; FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 28-29; Lawhawn Richburg-Hayes et al., Behavioral 
Economics & Social Policy: Designing Innovative Solutions for Programs Supported by the 
Administration for Children and Families 13-22, 23-28, 29-35 (OPRE Report 20 l 4- l 6a, April 2014), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/resource/behavioral-economics-and-social-policy-designing-
innovative-solutions-for-programs-supported-by-the-administration-for; WEBER, supra note 16, at 7-
8. 
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Ill. NUDGING PARENTS 
Having made the theoretical case for nudging parents, the task of this 
final Part is a more pragmatic one. In the discussion that follows, I consider how 
we might translate insights from behavioral economics into concrete law and 
policy initiatives for the childcare market. As in Part II, the discussion begins with 
behavioral theory, exploring implications for the institutional design of nudges. It 
then considers how these insights might inform childcare law and policy. Finally, 
it considers potential objections. 
A. Behavioral Law & Economics: Designing Nudges 
One of the primary contributions of behavioral law and economics is the 
recognition that in the face of behavioral market failure, law and policy can be 
carefully structured to nudge decision-makers in welfare-enhancing directions. 
Armed with an understanding of the complexity and fallibility of human judgment 
and decision-making, "behavioral bureaucrats" 290 or choice architects 291 can 
deliberately shape the environments in which people make decisions and thereby 
counteract behavioral market failure. 292 Taking a behaviorally-informed 
perspective, law and policy deliberately account for the broader contexts in which 
individuals make decisions. 293 As a backdrop to the recommendations below, this 
Section explores how behavioral insights inform state interventions in behavioral 
market failure, considering the overall goals, guiding principles, and methodology 
for designing nudges.294 I begin this exploration by considering what the overall 
goals of such design should be, and I then examine the design process. 
To suggest that an appropriate counter to behavioral market failure is to 
nudge individuals' raises a central normative question: Nudge toward what? In 
general, the overarching goal is to facilitate realization of an individuals' own, 
true preferences295-the ones they would pursue themselves, but for the foibles of 
human judgment and decision-making. Consequently, a central premise of 
behaviorally-informed market interventions is that choice architects should, as 
290 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1543. 
291 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 10. 
292 Id. at 3, 6. 
293 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2100. 
294 Despite strong theoretical work to develop a richer understanding of human behavior by 
incorporating behavioral science, behavioral law and economics has done much less work in the form 
of developing a framework or taxonomy for translating behavioral insights systematically into policy 
and regulation. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 124, at 721-22. For a behavioral framework 
proposal in the regulatory context, see generally id.; see also Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: 
Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23 MARKETING LETTERS 487, 488 (2012) (providing roadmap of the 
tools of choice architecture and illustrations of their application); Madrian, supra note 162, at 11-38 
(cataloging and evaluating a variety of behaviorally-informed policy tools). 
295 See Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2107. 
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much as possible, worry about means rather than ends.296 Nudges aim to leverage 
choice architecture to counteract bounded rationality and self-control without 
overriding personal choice or dramatically changing economic incentives. 297 In 
most cases, then, the normative goal of nudges and choice architecture should 
reflect the aggregate preferences of individuals themselves. 
Of course, when designing law and policy, it isn't possible to discern the 
preferences of each relevant individual. 298 This concern is even more pronounced 
given that many of our preferences are ill-defined. For the purposes of this project, 
I return to my initial observations in Part I. As discussed there, most parents report 
desiring high quality childcare and understand quality in ways that largely overlap 
with expert definitions. I will therefore consider developmentally-appropriate 
quality as the lodestar for designing childcare nudges. 299 
Moving from design goals to the design process, nudges will only be effective 
to the extent they are informed by what we know about imperfect rationality. 300 
Armed with an awareness of why people deviate from perfect rationality, we can 
structure choice architecture so as to counteract the heuristics and biases that lead 
to imperfect rationality. 301 Some nudges are best understood as efforts to curb 
heuristics and biases, while others actively deploy heuristics and biases to re-
direct human judgment and decision-making. 302 
In this regard, behavioral economics offers several general observations. 
First, contrary to rational choice theory, in a variety of contexts people's 
preferences are unclear and ill-formed rather than fixed. 303 When this is the case, 
their choices will inevitably be affected by the context, process, and environment 
in which they make decisions, whether constructed deliberately or not. 304 This 
being the case, nudges should be strategically designed to facilitate welfare-
296 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1835. 
297 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6. 
298 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1126. 
299 To the extent that childcare nudges will move parents in directions that are both individually and 
socially optimal, they should be Pareto improving: Everyone should be better off without making 
anyone worse off. Madrian, supra note 162, at 682. Indeed, especially because higher quality care 
generates significant social spillovers, nudges may be justified even when they push parents to choose 
care that might be inconsistent with maximizing their subjective expected utility. Professor Russell 
Korobkin has labeled this particular use of nudges "libertarian welfarism." Russell Korobkin, 
Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2009). 
Joo Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2107; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1832; Sunstein & Thaler, 
supra note 123, at 1166. 
JOI CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 16; NUDGE, supra note 13, at 13. 
Jo2 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2114. 
JOJ CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 7; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1159, 1161, 1164. 
J04 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1159, 1164. 
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enhancing choices. Second, because of what we know about imperfect rationality, 
we should expect error. 305 Choice architecture must therefore be designed to 
account for such missteps and accommodate change. Third, for the complex 
choices that most frequently cause people to stumble, we should structure them to 
make it easier for people to map their preferences onto available options by, for 
example, making information about various alternatives more accessible. 306 
Finally, policy interventions should be designed to provide feedback, which, as 
discussed above,307 enables people to learn from past missteps and to make more 
consistent decisions going forward. 308 
But well-designed nudges can do more than simply blunt the effects of 
heuristics and biases. Instead, one task of behavioral law and economics is to 
consider how to affirmatively leverage heuristics and biases, because although 
they are certainly at the root of some judgment and decision-making errors, they 
can also be promising part of the solution.309 Strategic use of heuristics and biases 
can counteract imperfect rationality. In particular, the availability heuristic, 
framing effects, anchors, and social norms can be co-opted to assist people in 
forming more accurate judgments and decisions. 
First, the availability heuristic that sometimes leads people astray can also 
work to improve judgment and decision-making. Strategically designing law and 
policy such that certain information or features of a choice are more vivid and 
salient can offset behavioral market failure. 31° Choice architects can become 
"availability entrepreneurs."311 Making long-term benefits more easily recalled 
and accessible can help people overcome present bias and time inconsistency by 
reminding them of the significance and desirability of these longer-term benefits. 
Via availability, choice architects can also ensure that overlooked information is 
more prominent and therefore factored into decision-making. Availability can 
also counteract optimism bias by exposing decision-makers to concrete instances 
of those circumstances that they underestimate. 312 And with both overoptimism 
and probability problems, availability can make negative outcomes more 
305 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 87-84. Several of these guidelines derive from Sunstein and Thaler's 
"nudge" mnemonic: iNcentives, Understanding mappings, Defaults, Give feedback, Expect errors, 
and the Structure complex choices. id. at 100; see Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2107. 
306 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 94--97; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2108. 
307 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
308 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 90, 97; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1212-13. 
309 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2115-16; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 227. 
310 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1537. 
311 Id. at 1521. 
312 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 210 (providing an example that shows that smokers are 
more likely to believe that smoking will harm them, and less likely to be overly optimistic, when they 
are aware of specific instances of such harm). 
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cognitively accessible when people assess risk, leading them to more accurate 
assessments. 313 
Second, framing effects can positively influence judgment and decision-
making. Choices depend in part on how they are presented.314 Because we are 
generally loss averse, framing consequences in terms of losses rather than gains 
can have significant effects on decision-making. 315 Framing can be especially 
helpful in addressing optimism bias by pressing decision-makers to confront the 
potential negative consequences of their decisions. 316 Similarly, framing a choice 
so as to highlights potential losses can facilitate more accurate assessments of 
risk.311 
Third and relatedly, anchors and defaults can improve judgments and 
decisions.318 As discussed above, people frequently make probability judgments 
with reference to a starting point, or anchor.319 They then make adjustments in the 
direction that seems appropriate. 320 Using this heuristic can have dramatic results. 
People will adjust an estimate from the anchor, but will nevertheless remain close 
to it.321 The status quo, or default, can thus act as a powerful anchor, influencing 
contemplated changes in the direction of existing plans or policies, which come 
to mind more easily than do new ones. 322 But the fact that anchors are so 
influential for judgment and choice need not be a negative. 323 In fact, anchors can 
serve as helpful nudges, correcting biased judgments and steering people toward 
their true preferences. Simply by suggesting a starting point, choice architects can 
influence decisions.324 
313 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 26; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 212, 213 n.11; Jolls et al., supra 
note 110, at 1537. 
314 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 36. 
315 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1537. 
316 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 216. 
317 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 216; Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1537. 
318 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 23 (explaining that we know that especially when people are uncertain 
and making assessments of probability, anchors can distort probabilistic judgment. In conditions of 
uncertainty, people use anchors as a starting point, and then adjust in the direction they deem 
appropriate). 
319 BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 132, at 5. 
320 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 23. 
321 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 72; NUDGE, supra note 13, at 23. 
322 HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 137, at 76. 
323 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1 178. 
324 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 24, 69-70. 
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Fourth and finally, heuristics and biases operate within the broader context 
of social norms, which themselves can act as powerful nudges. 325 Individual 
behavior frequently is influenced by more general social views and attitudes. 326 
Because we internalize social norms327 and seek social approval, social nonns can 
in tum affect individual construction of preferences. 328 Social norms impact 
individuals, telling them what to value. 329 This ability to affect preferences and 
behaviors makes social norms a potentially powerful tool in countering imperfect 
rationality. 330 Peer pressure can influence choice and change minds. Likewise, 
simply having information about what others are doing can impact choice. 331 Law 
can be self-consciously designed to either support or counteract social norms; it 
may also be deployed to create and influence their development in the first 
place.332 
With these general lessons from Behavioral Law and Economics in hand, I 
tum now to apply them in the context of childcare market interventions. 
B. Childcare Market Nudges 
A central lesson of this project is that conventional market failure 
interventions can address some, but not all, of the childcare market's 
dysfunctions. When we supplement our understanding of conventional market 
failure with an account of parents' imperfect rationality, it becomes clear that the 
impact of conventional remedies like subsidies, information, and regulation will 
be limited at best. From a behaviorally-informed perspective, simply providing 
subsidies to encourage the purchase of higher-quality care is a band-aid. Subsidies 
may increase demand for quality by altering parents' incentives, but do nothing 
to re-calibrate the way parents actually form judgments and make decisions about 
childcare.333 Regulation can act as a backstop against poor quality care, but as 
currently configured does little to inform parental decision-making.334 And once 
we understand that parents will filter information about childcare through a 
325 Id. at 43. 
326 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1127. 
327 Id. at 1130. 
328 Id. at 1130-31. 
329 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 19. 
33° Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1131. 
331 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 54, 59-60, 65-68. 
332 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1131-32. 
333 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 211-12. 
334 Through the lens of behavioral economics, regulation is an "insulating" strategy that protects 
market actors from the effects ofboundedly-rational choices. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 225. 
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cognitive process complicated by heuristics and biases, we recognize that simply 
providing information, without more, is likely to be inadequate.335 
Having now theorized behavioral market failure in our childcare market, the 
practical task is to translate theory into Jaw and policy prescriptions. Rather than 
somehow insulating parents from poor choices and bad outcomes ex post,336 a 
behaviorally informed response would target imperfect rationality head-on.337 
In the discussion that follows, I draw on lessons from behavioral law and 
economics to sketch out potential enhancements to our childcare law and 
policy. 338 Choice architects have a broad menu of nudges from which to choose. 
Here, I discuss those most apposite to the childcare market: strategic information 
disclosures, social norms, warnings, and procedural nudges. 339 
I. Strategic Information Disclosures 
To the extent people's imperfect rationality and self-control can lead them to 
ignore Jong-term benefits and overlook important information, the strategic 
provision of information is one antidote to behavioral market failure. 340 
Consequently, an important task for choice architects is to move beyond the 
straightforward provision of information to prescribing how it should be provided. 
335 See Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1533-34; Sun stein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1182. 
336 Jolls, supra note 126, at 18, 34. 
337 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 208. "It is not enough to make lots of choices available and 
then hope parents choose wisely. School systems need to put parents in a position to think through 
their choices, and to exercise their freedom rather than to rely on the default option. Both parents and 
children need the right incentives." NUDGE, supra note 13, at 206. 
338 Although theoretical and empirical scholarship on the behavioral economics of childcare choices 
is just beginning, scholars have begun applying lessons of behavioral economics to primary, 
secondary, and college education. See, e.g .. Hastings et al., supra note 169; Philip Oreopoulos, 
Behavioral Economics of Education: Progress and Possibilities (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 8853, 
Feb. 2015); Huriya Jabbar, The Behavioral Economics of Education: New Directions for Research, 40 
EDUC. RESEARCHER 446 (2011). 
339 See Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1832, 1835; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1189. Defaults 
are another popular nudging device, but one which is not especially apposite for the childcare market. 
Defaults can be especially effective in counteracting present bias. Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 
2120. 
340 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 202-03; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 132; 
Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1176. This intervention is not unique to behavioral market 
failure. Recall that one response to the information deficits in the childcare market-a conventional 
market failure-is the provision of missing information about the features and benefits of quality care, 
how to discern it, and where to find it. See supra Part LB. But because the behavioral economics 
diagnosis is different, the purpose of using information strategically as a nudge is related, but distinct. 
From a behavioral perspective, the problem is that parents suffer from excessive complexity and pay 
insufficient attention to the information they have about quality. Consequently, the purpose of using 
information as a nudge is to make childcare quality more salient and accessible. 
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The manner in which information is provided is critically important. 341 By 
leveraging availability, choice architects can highlight overlooked information in 
ways that make it more vivid and salient.342 Strategic information disclosures can 
refocus individuals on overlooked information. Better information and 
disclosures can improve feedback, empowering people to learn from past 
decisions and to improve their decision-making process.343 They can also help 
mitigate cognitive overload by simplifying information to facilitate a more 
straightforward choice. 344 
These insights have led to the development of "targeted transparency" 
nudges, which provide targeted, simplified disclosures at the time of decision-
making to move parties toward better decisions and providers toward improved 
services. 345 In the analogous context of primary and secondary public school 
choice, for example, targeted transparency has been shown to reduce the costs of 
acquiring and processing comparative information on school options, thereby 
increasing demand for higher-achieving schools and ultimately enhancing student 
achievement.346 These nudges also have the potential to pressure lower-quality 
providers to increase quality or lose students. 347 
Thus, perhaps the most useful-and least intrusive-childcare market nudges 
would come in the form of information. One of the most promising avenues for 
enhancing and refining the information parents have about childcare quality is to 
build on existing and proposed Quality Rating Improvement Systems (QRIS). 
State-administered QRIS systems are "a framework for organizing, guiding, and 
341 Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1535. 
342 Id. at 1520-21. 
343 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 189. 
344 Madrian, supra note 162, at 16-19. 
345 Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 
574, 578-79 (2012). Restaurant sanitation grading is the most common example of targeted 
transparency. Id. at 582. The goal is to make information on health risks more accessible and salient, 
which in tum should lead consumers to select restaurants accordingly, and incentivize under-
performing restaurants to improve. Id. As Professor Daniel Ho's exhaustive empirical study of 
restaurant grades has illustrated, however, existing grading systems are far from a panacea, and suffer 
from a variety of flaws as currently designed and implemented. Id. at 586-88. 
346 Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, Information. School Choice, and Academic 
Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1373, 1374 (2008). Providing 
simplified information to parents about school quality (in the form of academic achievement) 
significantly increased their demand for academic achievement. See Hastings et al., supra note 169, at 
24, 26-27 (finding that simplified information impacts parental choice and preferences, primarily by 
lowering information and decision-making costs); see also NUDGE, supra note 13, at 202-03 
(discussing same study). 
347 Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 346, at 1376. Of course, even with simplified and more accessible 
information, studies also suggest that parents must in fact have a range of high-quality, available 
options from which to actually choose. Id. 
116 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [19:2016] 
gauging the progress of early care and education initiatives." 348 Via QRIS 
programs, states collect information about childcare quality and then 
communicate that information to childcare consumers, enabling them to 
distinguish among providers in their communities according to the level of quality 
care provided.349 About half of the states have implemented QRIS systems and 
most of the remaining states have pilot programs or plans for implementation.350 
QRIS programs and other, similar approaches can present information 
strategically to counteract bounded rationality in the childcare market. First, these 
programs can help ensure that parents are mindful of important but often 
overlooked information-information about childcare quality in addition to, say, 
cost, location, hours, etc. These systems highlight this neglected information, 
describing standards used to assess childcare quality such as provider 
qualifications, learning environment, curricula, and activities, as well as 
explaining how childcare quality is assessed. Second, through broad accessibility, 
these programs use availability to make developmentally significant quality more 
salient for parents and families. And there may be also opportunities to nudge 
parents toward particular childcare arrangements of high quality by framing 
programs in particular ways.351 
Third, these systems can enhance the accuracy of probabilistic judgments and 
decisions about quality by keying them to evidence-based quality indicators. 
Fourth, the QRIS approach can help parents structure complex choices by 
enabling them to map their preferences onto the menu of available options. 352 
Finally, to the extent parents have already made childcare decisions, QRIS 
information can provide them with feedback on the level of quality care they have 
selected in the form of a quality rating for their selected childcare provider. 
2. Information Campaigns and Social Norms 
Broader public information campaigns about the significance and features of 
childcare quality could similarly counteract behavioral market failure. 353 These 
campaigns could suggest characteristics to seek in initial placements, as well as 
348 See Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29, 442, 29462 (May 20, 
2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98). See also SMART BEGINNINGS, 
http://www.smartbeginnings.org/home/star-quality-initiative/about-virginia-quality.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2015) (providing an example of a QRIS system, specifically the Virginia initiative "Virginia 
Quality."). 
349 See 78 Fed. Reg. at 29,460. 
350 See Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 29,442, 29,446. 
351 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 16. 
352 Cf NUDGE, supra note 13, at 93-94 (describing smart disclosure program "RECAP": Record, 
Evaluate, and Compare Alternative Prices). 
353 See Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1224; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1888-90. 
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what to expect from such placements. 354 First, by making the features and 
cumulative effects of quality childcare more salient, these campaigns would 
highlight overlooked information and help to blunt present bias by emphasizing 
the longer-term benefits of quality care. Second, using Joss aversion and framing 
to focus on potential losses associated with unlicensed, unsafe, and lower-quality 
care could help counteract excessive optimism and recalibrate probability 
assessments. 355 Finally, to the extent some families' preferences concerning 
childcare quality are ill-formed, information campaigns might nudge families 
toward higher-quality care. Such campaigns would, again, use availability to 
make quality more salient. 
Information campaigns might take a variety of forms. Federal agencies like 
the Administration for Children and Families' Office of Child Care could initiate 
a national-level conversation about childcare quality. State agencies might also 
devise state-wide initiatives aimed at increasing the salience of quality care. Or 
campaigns might be geared more narrowly toward particular sources of 
information, like QRIS programs. Most parents are unaware of existing state and 
local QRIS systems, 356 and researchers and agency actors are still working to 
understand how to make QRIS programming more family friendly. 357 States 
might devise public awareness campaigns for QRIS in ways that emphasize 
particular features of quality care. 358 Finally, local, community-based 
initiatives-yard signs, open houses, and the like-could be used to make quality 
more salient.359 
Information campaigns can also go beyond simply informing to attempts at 
persuasion via social norms.360 Importantly, strategic information disclosures can 
provide information about family priorities in choosing childcare (highlighting 
multiple studies indicating that parents rate quality as important, e.g.), thereby 
communicating a social norm of selecting quality childcare, potentially enhancing 
and solidifying that norm. 361 In tum, social networks would communicate this 
norm to individual community members, signaling particular choices for quality 
354 Indeed, information campaigns are especially important for initial decisions, given that endowment 
effects and status quo bias may discourage parents from leaving suboptimal childcare settings. See 
supra notes 245, 256, 269 and accompanying text. 
355 Vandenbergh et al., supra note 124, at 749. 
356 FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 25. 
357 Id. at 28. 
358 Id. at 26 (explaining how a recent public awareness project in Utah led to fewer children in informal 
childcare arrangements, and increased parental awareness of quality provided in their existing care 
arrangements). 
359 Id. at 30. 
360 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1888. 
361 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at I 131. 
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childcare. 362 We know that parents receive most of their information about 
childcare from informal sources in their community-friends, family, and 
neighbors. 363 Thus, to the extent particular quality childcare arrangements become 
a community norm, more parents may be nudged toward selecting them. 
3. Required Warnings 
Especially the face of overoptimism and probability miscalculations, 
information disclosures alone may be insufficient to check bounded rationality. 
In this context, translating information into more assertive warnings can nudge 
people toward their desired ends. 364 Warnings counteract excessive optimism and 
thus lead to more accurate risk assessments by highlighting risk factors and 
explaining how negative outcomes might occur. 365 Consumer safety regulations 
requiring information disclosures and warnings employ these types of nudges 
because consumers often do not adequately appreciate the risks posed by using 
certain products. 366 
Warnings hold promise as an effective counter to overoptimism and 
probability mistakes in the childcare context. Like information disclosures, 
warnings can make information on the incidence and effects of low-quality 
childcare more salient. Warning leverage loss aversion: By directing attention to 
potential dangers and losses, they can help steer families toward higher-quality 
childcare. For example, in conjunction with licensing efforts, states might 
establish childcare "blacklists" highlighting the most egregious examples of 
unsafe and low quality childcare. When childcare advocates and the media target 
these providers, the blacklist can serve as a useful social nudge. 367 
4. Procedural Nudges 
State law and policy can also address imperfect rationality by including 
certain procedural mechanisms within choice architecture. When people confront 
complex choices, these mechanisms are designed to ensure that those choices are 
362 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 17. 
363 FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 13. 
364 See generally Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1851. 
365 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 209; Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at I 190; Sunstein, 
supra note 133, at 1952. 
366 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 207. 
367 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 191 (explaining that providers will want to avoid the consequences of 
bad publicity and will be motivated to avoid making the blacklist, creating a sort of competition to 
"race to the top"). Policymakers must take care, however, to focus on providers and avoid 
inadvertently creating a new front for the "Mommy Wars" or otherwise stigmatize the children and 
families using suboptimal care. 
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rational, voluntary, and pursue expected utility. 368 They might include defaults in 
the event that no choice is made, with the default based on an estimation of 
expected goals. 369 They might force people to actively choose so as to avoid 
inertia and status quo bias. 370 They might require individuals to confirm their 
receipt and understanding of certain information before making a choice. Or they 
might simply ensure that material information is salient by priming decision 
makers. 
In the childcare market, the state could use procedural constraints via the 
documentation required when parents interact with the state to seek childcare 
subsidies through the CCDF or the federal income tax system. Subsidy 
applications and paperwork could anchor licensed and/or accredited care as the 
default or starting point choice, e.g., by soliciting or requiring licensing 
information before subsidies will be provided. If, by contrast, parents have opted 
for unlicensed care, procedural nudges might require active disclosure of this fact 
and an explanation. Similarly, this documentation could request information 
about public and private accreditation via QRIS ratings or organizations like the 
National Association for Education of Young Children. 
Regardless of the type or quality of care ultimately selected, the presence of 
these constraints would prime parents to consider quality in their decision-making 
calculus, and make quality proxies like licensing more salient. In one study of 
childcare preferences, for example, simply asking parents to complete a 
questionnaire gave them a clearer perspective on childcare quality: "Completing 
the questionnaire linked the concept [of quality] to their experience, gave 
articulation to their perceptions, or reinforced what they privately observed and 
hesitantly believed."371 In other words, simply completing a survey can nudge 
parents to consider childcare features they may have overlooked. 372 
For subsidies, yet another option would be to employ "hard" paternalism 
through financial incentives by keying or conditioning subsidy payments to the 
use of higher-quality providers. 373 Indeed, the Office of Child Care encourages 
states to account for quality in determining subsidy rates. 374 Proponents of a more 
368 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1189. 
369 Id. at 1188. 
370 Madrian, supra note 162, at 15. 
371 EMLEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 5-6. 
372 MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 36. 
373 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 211; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1116. More 
assertive pressure on CCDF parents must be weighed against the reality that family law for the poor 
all too frequently constrains family decision-making rather than supporting it. See JILL ELAINE 
HASDAY, FAMILY LAW RErMAGINED 196-97 (2014). 
374 See Child Care and Development Fund Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442, 29,478 (proposed May 20, 
2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98). 
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narrow or conservative understanding of nudges would respond, however, that 
financial incentives would change individuals' motivation for making particular 
choices, but not necessarily the actual process by which they make those 
choices. 375 
Finally, an important lesson from behavioral law and economics is that we 
should expect parents to make mistakes. 376 Subsidy architects should anticipate 
these errors by putting mechanisms in place to facilitate changes to childcare 
arrangements, ensuring such changes can be effected expeditiously and without 
risk of losing substantial subsidy monies. 
Armed with what we know from behavioral economics, these enhancements 
have the potential to better support parental decision-making and facilitate 
parents' pursuit and realization of their childcare goals. Because the effects of 
behaviorally informed law and policy in the childcare context have not yet been 
studied empirically, these are, necessarily, a preliminary set of recommendations. 
Going forward, it will be important to carefully test new initiatives for their 
efficacy and ensure that their benefits outweigh any experienced costs. 377 
In conclusion, using behavioral law and economics to reform childcare law 
and policy holds promise in mitigating behavioral market failure. But of course, 
actively exploiting law to influence individual judgment and decisions is not 
without controversy and risk. In the discussion below, I anticipate and respond to 
important concerns about nudging parents. 
C. Objections: Nudging Parents? 
As the concept of nudging makes plain, the argument of behavioral law and 
economics analysis is that it is legitimate-and indeed desirable-for government 
to attempt to influence choice.378 Those who advocate nudging are unapologetic 
in their call for self-conscious efforts by the state to steer people toward their 
desired ends.379 But these prescriptions raise important questions about individual 
autonomy and the legitimacy of state intervention. 380 Some of the most important 
objections to nudges concern paternalism, pluralism, and the risk of government 
error. Each of these objections has special significance in the family context. 
Below I explore these critiques and then respond to them. 
375 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 21 1-12. 
376 See supra text accompanying note 245. 
377 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2122-23; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 230; see, e.g., 
CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 31-32 (suggesting testing whether public information campaigns 
are more effective when designed in light of social norms). 
378 See, e.g., Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1178, 1192; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, 
at 1162. 
379 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 5. 
380 Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2117. 
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1. Paternalism 
The paternalism critique centers around the legitimacy of state efforts to 
influence choice and behavior, 381 which potentially interferes with individual 
autonomy and agency.382 For many, freedom of choice is an important component 
of individual welfare, at the least, or more broadly an end in itself-a bedrock 
principle oflibertarianism.383 Though the paternalism critique takes on a different 
cast in this context (after all, there are third parties involved in childcare 
decisions), there is another, related source of resistance as least as powerful: 
family liberty and autonomy. 
This objection is especially sharp in the context of the state role in parental 
decision-making. Privacy and nonintervention norms predominate both family 
law and social ideology around the state's relationship to families. 384 Broadly, the 
family privacy doctrine provides a backstop against government interference, 
protecting private family decisions. 385 More specifically, the right of fit parents to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children is "an 
enduring American tradition," 386 and "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests."387 Parental decisions concerning childrearing are central to this 
right, especially in the face of second-guessing or overriding by the state. 388 To 
carry the critique forward, surely nudges have the potential to be especially 
worrisome in the context of parental decision-making about childcare. 
As conceptualized, nudges are deliberately designed to include checks 
against undue paternalism. First, the primary goal of nudges is to tweak 
individuals' means but not their ends--enhancing their welfare as the individuals 
themselves see it, not the state.389 The idea is to facilitate the maximization of 
individuals' own preferences. Second, the paternalism envisioned by nudges is 
libertarian in that it preserves freedom of choice and allows individuals to opt 
381 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1162. 
382 Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1211-12; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 231; Sunstein, supra 
note 133, at 1881. 
383 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1881-83. 
384 These nonns are part of the "canon" of family law for intact, affluent families, but often are not 
observed in family law's interaction with the poor. HASDAY, supra note 373, at 196-97. 
385 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 687-89. 
386 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
387 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). 
388 See, e.g., id. 
389 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 5; Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2126; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 
1855. 
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out.390 Thus, nudges may steer toward or encourage a particular choice, but they 
don't mandate it. Third, nudges constitute "soft" or "asymmetric" paternalism. 
They avoid material costs on individual choice,391 and impose minimal costs on 
those decision-makers who are more closely aligned with the homo economicus 
model of rationality and self-control.392 Thus, like other market actors, parents 
would ultimately be free to tum in different directions. 
More broadly, in many domains, some sort of influence is unavoidable.393 
That is to say, choice architecture is inevitable. 394 As a result, the ways in which 
legal rules and policies are designed necessarily will influence people's 
choices. 395 For many choices, the government must at a minimum provide a 
starting point. 396 Likewise, as behavioral economics makes clear, there is no 
neutral way to provide information. 397 As discussed above, social norms are 
pervasive and powerfully influential. 398 In short, nudges-both intentional and 
unintentional-are everywhere. 399 That being the case, it is far better to 
deliberately structure them to maximize welfare, as reflected by aggregate 
preferences. 400 
A different response to these critiques comes from family law and policy 
itself: Family privacy, generally, and parental autonomy, specifically, are not 
monoliths. 401 Preferences favoring nonintervention and autonomy don't always 
390 See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 5; Jolls, supra note 126, at 39; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 
1201. Not all scholars, however, are sanguine about the choice-preserving limitations of nudging. 
Professors Bubb and Pildes, for example, have argued that Behavioral Law and Economics "trims its 
sails" unnecessarily by limiting behaviorally-informed regulation to choice-preserving interventions. 
See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 281, at 1599-1600. 
391 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1860. 
392 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 249; Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1212, 1219; Jolls & Sunstein, supra 
note 132, at 203, 226. 
393 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1159. 
394 Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1879; see also NUDGE, supra note 13, at 237; Sunstein & Thaler, supra 
note 123, at 1199. 
395 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1164. 
396 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1165. 
397 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 243; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 232. 
398 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 246; Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1879. 
399 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 246. 
400 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1161. 
401 Indeed, a number of prominent family law scholars reject the family-state binary as far too 
simplistic, overshadowing the ways in which the state affirmatively ought to support families. See, 
e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S 
POLITICAL IDEALS 3, 77-80 (2010); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A 
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2005). 
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trump the state's separate and independent interest in child wellbeing. 402 In fact, 
the state intervenes regularly in questions of child custody, support, and child 
welfare to override parental decisions when they aren't in the best interests of 
children. These interventions are justified by the state's role as parens patriae-
to protect those who are legally incapable of protecting themselves. 403 Indeed, 
such interventions, even going so far as to override ends or goals, are consistent 
with economic interventions that are justified when third party effects are 
apparent.404 To the extent these interventions are steering parents toward their 
children' interests rather than their own, perhaps they are not paternalistic at all. 
2. Pluralism 
A second concern with nudging is that to the extent government seeks proxies 
for welfare in designing policy, nudging toward a one-size-fits-all solution will 
reduce welfare. 405 Different people have different circumstances and preferences, 
and will balance them in different ways.406 In any number of contexts, people may 
simply disagree as to what best advances their welfare.407 
As with paternalism, this concern takes on a special dimension in the family 
law context. Indeed, the genesis of the family liberty cases arose in an era in which 
concerns about state totalitarianism were manifest, and families were linked 
countervailing democratic values.408 Concerns about standardizing children were 
explicit in these debates.409 Family pluralism and parental autonomy in the face 
of state hegemony acted as a check against a homogenized population. 410 Studies 
confirm that childcare preferences vary according to a number of family 
characteristics: the child(ren), parental employment, parental stress and beliefs, 
family income, socioeconomic status, family structure, and community. 411 In the 
view of the pluralism critique, the concern is that when choice architects make 
generalizations about what most parents "want," they will not only override some 
individual choices but also tend to standardize childcare decisions in ways that 
are troubling from a pluralism perspective. 
402 Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 687-89. 
403 See id. 
404 Cf NUDGE, supra note 13, at 221 ("When a child's interests are involved, mandates are perfectly 
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Again, translated for the childcare decision-making context, childcare nudges 
would seek to advance parents' own goals vis-a-vis childcare: to locate and secure 
quality childcare for their children.412 Parents would be free ultimately to make 
individualized decisions about childcare, even in the face of nudges in different 
directions. Additionally, parents who are acting rationally would not suffer 
materially for making choices that depart from the direction of nudges. Retaining 
this ultimate autonomy would ensure that to the extent that families have 
pluralistic preferences and values as to childcare, they continue to be expressed. 
What is more, nudges will operate in a childcare market that will continue to 
respond to consumer preferences, therefore presenting a range of childcare 
alternatives from which parents can choose. 413 
3. Error and Bias 
A third critique worries about government error and bias.414 Public choice 
theory posits that public officials have agendas and biases just like the rest ofus. 415 
First, they are no less human than others, and are unlikely to be immune to the 
same heuristics and biases that can lead to errors in judgment and decision-
making.416 Second, public officials and agencies are susceptible to capture by 
powerful private interest groups and may therefore not make decisions to further 
the public's own goals.417 And finally, critics worry that rather than working to 
facilitate the achievement of individuals' goals, government will act to further its 
own in ways that don't prioritize the general welfare. 418 Because nudges often are 
subtle, overreach is a special concem.419 
As above, concerns about government error and bias take on a special 
character in the case of the family. Not infrequently, the state has stepped in to 
substitute its own judgments and values for those of parents and family members, 
to the harm of both families and children. Indeed, the presumption that fit parents 
act in the best interests of their children is intended to guard against just these 
sorts of harmful substitute judgments. To permit the state to nudge parental 
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childcare decisions is to raise the specter of a government influenced by its own 
biases-both cognitive and cultural-nudging parents in its own desired 
directions rather than parents'. 
The primary response to the error and bias problem is to again observe that 
nudges preserve freedom of choice and so to the extent that choice architects err, 
those errors need not necessarily be visited on the choosers.420 A second response 
to concerns about error and bias extols the virtues of technocrats. These specialists 
in particular disciplines can work to overcome error in judgments and decisions. 421 
Because technocrats will be well-versed in behavioral economics, they will be in 
a better position than most to self-correct for imperfect rationality and bounded 
self-control. And indeed, one aim of the regulatory agency model is to insulate 
these technocrats from political and popular pressure. 422 A third response is to line 
up the incentives of choice architects so that they put aside their own agendas and 
look to facilitate the general welfare.423 Fourth and finally, behavioral law and 
economics makes explicit that nudges and choice architecture should be designed 
to ensure transparency and enable monitoring to guard against error, bias, and 
overreach.424 The constitutional framework, and in particular judicial review of 
agency action, can help to counteract error in choice architecture. 425 
In sum, childcare nudges and choice architecture would seek to balance 
concerns about imperfect rationality on the one hand, and parental agency on the 
other. By definition, nudges are not shoves. 426 Instead, they seek to insulate 
judgment and choice from the most detrimental effects of heuristics and biases, 
while empowering parents to maximize their utility by choosing the quality and 
category of care they desire. 
CONCLUSION 
While most all parents would concede they're far from perfect, they strive to 
do right by their children. Studies confirm that parents endeavor to act in the best 
interests of their children when selecting childcare: Quality is one of their top 
priorities-often the top priority. Yet we also know that parents, like the rest of 
us, will be influenced by heuristics and biases when they make decisions-often 
to their benefit, but sometimes to their detriment. Taking a behaviorally informed 
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approach to childcare market interventions can help parents overcome imperfect 
rationality when selecting and securing quality care for their children. 
In the end, no single analytical frame alone can adequately respond to the 
childcare market's failings. 427 Indeed, many families will be unable to access the 
quality they seek unless or until they have the resources to do so. But adding 
behavioral insights to the childcare law and policy toolkit is one step toward a 
better functioning childcare market and a better network to care for, develop, and 
nurture America's children. 
427 As a society we must confront our collective shortsightedness as reflected in the country's overall 
level of childcare funding; greater investments now would yield considerable long-term benefits for 
America's children, families, communities, and society at large. 
